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MANAGING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A ROLE FOR
MANDATORY "LIMITED GENEROSITY" CLASSES AND
ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS?
Joan Steinman"
In this Article, I consider whether "limited generosity" classes
may be used to determine a defendant's entire liability for puni-
tive damages arising from a defined course of conduct. The
goals of such a class action would include adequately punish-
ing and deterring the defendant, keeping the defendant's liabil-
ity within state-mandated and constitutional limits, and facili-
tating equitable distribution of the damages among injured
plaintiffs. The Article describes the legal limits on punitive
damages liability that states have established and that the Su-
preme Court has held substantive due process to impose, and
then carefully examines whether such limits constitute a predi-
cate for mandatory class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(BJ of
the Federal Rules and analogous state rules. I consider, in par-
ticular, the implications of the Supreme Court's 1999 decision
in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. for such punitive damages classes.
In the final section of the Article, I consider the obstacles to is-
suance of anti-suit injunctions that could prevent mandatory
punitive damages classes from being undermined by parallel
pursuit of such damages in separate actions brought by class
members.
I. "LIMITED GENEROSITY" CLASSES-AN INTRODUCTION 1045
II. LEGAL LIMITS ON LIABILITY FOR PuNITIVE DAMAGES 1049
A. Statutory and Common Law Limits 1049
B. Constitutional Limits 1053
III. Do SUCH LEGAL LIMITS CONSTITUTE A PREDICATE FOR RULE
23(b)(1)(B) CLASS CERTIFICATION? 1060
A. Case Antecedents to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 1060
B. Cases Decided Under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 1062
C. The Viability of Limited Generosity Theory as a Predi-
cate for (b)(l)(B) Certification 1075
1. A Fund with a Definitely Ascertained Limit Which,
at its Maximum, is Exceeded by Aggregate Liqui-
dated Punitive Damages Claims 1075
1043
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759600
1044 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
a. State La:w/Multiple Law Complications 1075
b. Limitations Imposed by Due Process 1079
c. Liquidation of Aggregate Punitive Damages
Claims 1079
2. All of the Fund to be Distributed to Those with (Liq-
uidated) Claims that are Based on a Common The-
ory of Liability 1081
a. Common Theory 1081
b. Under-inclusiveness 1081
c. Defining the Course-of-Conduct 1082
3. All Claimants Sharing a Common Theory of Recov-
ery to be Treated Equitably Among Themselves,
Typically (Historically) by a Pro Rata Distribution of
the Fund 1083
4. Other Arguments in Favor of Limited Generosity
(b)(l)(B) Class Certifications 1084
5. Other Concerns Fostering Conservative Handling of
(b)(1)(B) Certification Motions 1085
a. The Rules Enabling Act 1085
b. Unconsented-to Compromise of Constitutional
Rights 1086
N. INJUNCTIONS OF PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH PuNITIVE DAMAGES
ARE SOUGHT FOR THE SAME COURSE OF CONDUCT 1087
A. Federal Injunctions of State Court Proceedings 1088
1. The All Writs Act, The Anti-Injunction Act, and The
Ability to Protect Mandatory Class Actions 1088
a. The All Writs Act 1088
b. The Anti-Injunction Act and the Ability to Pro-
tect Mandatory Class Actions 1089
2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 23 1099
B. State Court Injunctions of State Court Proceedings 1103
C. Personal Jurisdiction to Enjoin 1105
V. CONCLUSION 1109
When companies are alleged to have tortiously caused vast hu~
man suffering, often over a long period of time, and are sued for both
compensatory and punitive damages, sometimes in multiple
action lawsuits, some folks would be pleased if the companies were
put out of business by awards of such damages. Others, people and
entities whose wealth and quality of life are enhanced by the defen-
dant companies (including the defendants' employees, stockholders
and trading partners, communities to which such corporations and
their employees contribute, even states), may greatly fear the poten-
tial outcome of the litigation. Although many aspects of SUlJstlSllltlve
law and procedure could be utilized to cabin the consequences
such lawsuits, l this Article will consider the viability of two ex:istlLUg
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, IllinoiS
procedural tools that also may afford benefits to plaintiffs, in the ag-
gregate, and conserve judicial resources: "limited generosity" man-
datory classes2 and injunctions against the pursuit of punitive dam-
ages in tort suits that overlap with class litigation. Although
crippling damage awards can be made in a single case, defendants
and their supporters often are most concerned about the cumulative
effect of multiple judgments, particularly with the cumulative effect
of multiple punitive damages awards. Both focuses of this Article
have relevance when multiple lawsuits that are either proceeding or
anticipated could result in multiple punitive damages awards for the
same course of conduct.
I. "LIMITED GENEROSITY" CLASSES-AN INTRODUCTION
Although the subject of this symposium is state court class ac-
tions, I will concentrate on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure because many state class action rules are modeled upon it.3
Rule 23 and state law analogues allow an action to be main-
tained as a class action if the prosecution of separate actions by in-
dividual members of the class would create a risk of adjudications
with respect to individual class members that would, as a practical
matter, dispose of the interests of other members who are not par-
ties or substantially impair or impede the ability of those other
members to protect their interests.4 The Advisory Committee Notes
Institute of Technology. A.B. 1969, University of Rochester; J.D. 1973, Harvard
University. I would like to thank Cindy Stuyvesant, a current student, and
Melanie Maron and Bethany Schols, recent graduates of Chicago-Kent, for their
research assistance, my colleagues Nancy Marder and Margaret Stewart for
their valuable comments on drafts of this Article and in discussions of its sub-
ject matter, aild the Marshall Ewell Research Fund for financial support.
1. Substantive and procedural law also could be legislatively modified in
numerous respects to control the potential consequences of such lawsuits.
2. Mandatory class actions are those in which absent class members are
not entitled to notice or to exclude themselves as a matter of right under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state law analogues. See Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 n.13 (1999).
3. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B); ALAsKA R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B); ARIZ.
R. CT. 23(b)(1)(B); ARK. R. CIY. P. 23(b); COLO. R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B); DEL. CT.
C.P.R. 23(b)(1)(B); D.C. R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B); FLA. R. CIY. P. 1.220(b)(1)(B);
HAw. R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B); IDAHO R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B); IOWA R. CIY. P.
42.3(a)(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223(b)(1)(B) (1994); Ky. R. CIY. P. 23.02(a)(ii);
LA. C.C.P. ART. 591(B)(1)(b) (1999); Mo. R. CIY. P. 52.08(b)(1)(B); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 25-20-RULE 23(b)(1)(B) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 2023(B)(1)(b)
(2000); OR. R. CIY. P. 32(B)(1)(b); PA. R. CIY. P. 1708(a)(3)(ii); S.C. R. CIY. P.
19(a)(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-6-23(b)(1)(B) (1984); TEX. R. CIY. P. 39(a)(2).
4. See FED. R. CIY. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Before "certifYing" a case as a class ac-
tion, a district court must find in addition that "the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable," that "there are questions of law or fact
common to the class," that the claims (or defenses) of the named representative
plaintiffs (or defendants) are typical of the claims (or defenses) of the class, and
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class." FED. R. CIY. P. 23(a).
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to the Rule make clear the drafters' view that this provision is satis-
fied ''when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund in-
sufficient to satisfy all claims," among other occasions.5 Although
claimants often contend that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is satisfied when a
comparison of (a) the total probable liability to be incurred from as-
yet unliquidated claims with (b) the assets available to satisfy those
claims demonstrates the inadequacy of the latter "fund" to pay all
the claims,6 the focus of this Article is not on such insufficient-assets
In tobacco litigation and other mass tort cases in which harm is alleged
to have been done to many geographically dispersed individuals, over a long pe-
riod of time, and perhaps as the result of a variety of breaches of duty, plaintiffs
may have difficulty satisfying some of these requirements. While the numbers,
geographic dispersion, and other characteristics of the plaintiffs often make it
easy to find that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-
ticable, it may be less clear that there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, that the claims of the named representative plaintiffs are typical of
the claims of the class, or that the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.· The difficulties of meeting Rule
23(a)'s requirements may be exacerbated if the class is defined to include future
members, who have not yet manifested injury.
However, fact questions concerning a defendant's knowledge about the
dangerousness of its product-what defendant knew and when it came to know
particular facts, what information it withheld from the public, and what it
stated in advertising and in product instructions-exemplify what may be
common questions as to sub-classes and perhaps as to the entire proposed
plaintiff class. Punitive damages are well suited for class treatment because
the focus is on defendants' conduct and wealth, rather than on matters peculiar
to individual plaintiffs. Similarly, there may be questions of law as to the re-
quirements and standards for punitive damage awards that are common to sub-
classes, and perhaps to the entire proposed plaintiff class. See, e.g., Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming a Rule
23(b)(3) certification, and noting that, "[iln mass tort accidents, the factual and
legal issues of a defendant's liability do not differ dramatically from one plain-
tiff to the next"); JenkIns v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470-71 (5th
Cir. 1986) (finding common questions in asbestos-related personal injury
raising, inter alia, the viability of the "state of the art" defense); In re N. Dist.
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847,850 (9th Cir.
(indicating that all the matters listed above might have been questions of
common to all or many of the plaintiffs in this products liability case in
the district court had certified a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damages class),
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
The typicality requirement may be relatively easy to satisfY when
class certification is for punitive damages recovery only, again because the
is concentrated on the defendant and its conduct. See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 F.2d
474 (noting that, in the context of a Rule 23(b)(3) certification, when the
punitive damages, the focus is on the defendants' conduct, not on the plslinl;itt!rJ
Similarly, there are no inherent obstacles to finding adequate class re]:lreJ3eDlta-
tives, so long as the class and sub-classes are appropriately structured.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627-28 (1997) (emphasizing
need for structural assurances of adequate representation through proper
classing).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) advisory committee's note.
6. See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 820-21 (examining a situation where
tiffs sought certification, for settlement purposes, of a mandatory
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limited fund class actions.7
Rather, it is on a variant of the insufficient-assets notion.s The
term "limited generosity" has been coined to describe situations in
which a legal limit on liability (rather than defendant's capacity to
pay) creates the ceiling on recovery that might justifY a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) certification.9 If limitations on liability imposed by the
law would eliminate or restrict the ability of later plaintiffs to re-
cover against the defendant, the interests of the later plaintiffs
would have been disposed of, impaired, or impeded, in a manner
that arguably would justifY certifying a class of all those whose in-
terests were endangered by the law-imposed limitation on liability.
Two parenthetical remarks: first, the limited generosity concept
typically has been mentioned in connection with possible legal limits
on punitive damages, but in theory it is equally applicable to legal
limits on the recovery of compensatory damages. Nonetheless, as a
practical matter, legislatures and courts have seldom imposed ag-
gregate limitations upon compensatory damages, so the greatest re-
23(b)(1)(B) "limited fund" class of persons who had personal injury claims aris-
ing out oftheir exposure to defendant's asbestos products); Coburn v. 4-R Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certifying under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) where
claims in excess of $16 million had been asserted for injuries and deaths result-
ing from a supper club fire and the court figured that if liability were found, the
total damages would far exceed the defendant's assets), mandamus denied, 588
F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979); see also 7A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CML 2d §
1774 n.7 (1986 & Supp. 2001) (citing cases). The Court in Ortiz found, however,
that "the Advisory Committee did not contemplate that the mandatory class ac-
tion codified in subdivision (b)(l)(B) would be used to aggregate unliquidated
tort claims on a limited fund rationale." Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 843. While the Ortiz
Court did not decide whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) ever may be used to aggregate
individual tort claims, it did infer from the Advisory Committee's Notes that the
Rule's historical antecedents should be viewed as imposing requirements for
(b)(l)(B) certification, rather than as merely illustrating situations sufficient to
satisfy the Rule. See id. at 842-44. These conclusions have implications for the
certifiability oflimited generosity classes as well.
7. The insufficient assets contention also might be plausible in some of the
same cases in which defendants might argue for a "limited generosity" con-
straint upon the award of punitive damages.
8. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1005-06 (3d Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that limited generosity theory is a variation, and functional equivalent, of
the limited fund notion, for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) purposes), cert. denied sub nom. Ce-
lotex Corp. v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
9. Sch. Asbestos, 789 F.2d at 1004-05 (referring to "limited generosity"
theory, an apparent reference to limiting a jury's "generosity" in awarding puni-
tive damages); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Heaney, C.J., dissenting) (speaking of the concept as a basis for (b)(l)(B) certi-
fication, without using the words "limited generosity"), cert. denied sub nom.
Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). Other courts and commentators havere-
ferred to the same notion as "punitive damages overkill," or as ''limited punish-
ment" theory. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas M. Sobol, Equity for the Vic-
tims, Equity for the Transgressor:, The Classwide Treatment of Punitive
Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2005, 2013 (2000); see also Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-41 (2d Cir. 1967).
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alistic potential for limited generosity theory is in connection with
punitive damages. 1o In light of the purposes of the symposium of
which this Article is a part, this writing will restrict its attention to
limited generosity mandatory classes seeking punitive damages.
Second, while, on its face, a limited generosity class is certified
for the benefit of the class members and to ensure equitable distri-
bution of the monies that the law permits to be recovered/I the un-
derlying concept-that the law does (or should be held to) impose a
limit on liability for punitive damages for a particular course of con-
duct-is advocated by defendants, in the service of their own pecu-
niary interests. In addition, because Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes are
"mandatory," that is, members of those classes are not permitted to
"opt out,,,12 (b)(1)(B) certification is a boon to defendants in that it
protects them from the burdens and uncertainties of multiple pieces
of litigation seeking punitive damages, brought by those within the
class definition.13 ,
I seek here to do three things: (1) to present my findings on the
reality behind this theory: What, if any, legal limits have the courts
actually found to constrain punitive damages awards?; (2) to con-
sider whether such legal limits as the courts have found properly
constitute a predicate for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class certification; and (3)
to examine the scope and limits upon courts' power to enjoin the
commencement or prosecution of separate actions by class members
who assert punitive damages claims within the scope of a manda-
tory class action.14 If legal limits on punitive damages do properly
10. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994) (limiting total damages for certain acci-
dents involving nuclear energy to $500 million, excluding costs of investigation
and settlement of claims, which the statute limits to $60 million).
11. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 839 (noting that a common characteristic of clas-
sic limited fund cases was that "the claimants identified by a common theory of
recovery were treated equitably among themselves").
12. See FED. R. CN. P. 23(c)(2), (3) (authorizing class members to exclude
themselves from classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), but not under Rules
23(b)(I)(A), (b)(I)(B), or (b)(2».
13. See infra notes 205-94 and accompanying text (regarding the ability of
courts to enjoin the commencement or prosecution of separate actions by class
members who seek to assert claims within the scope of a mandatory class ac-
tion). Defendants may have additional reflsons that they do not publicize to
vor the certification of mandatory punitive damages classes. A leading com-
mentator on class actions has argued that the certification of a Rule 23(b)(I)(B)
mandatory punitive damages class usually works to the defendant's advantage
in at least two respects. First, the absence of punitive damage awards in indi-
vidual suits will postpone financial pressure on defendants, which, in turn,
"deter or defer prompt classwide settlements." In addition, "as [a] Drl:lCtlLcar
matter, [it] will result in the class as a whole receiving less ... Dunitive
ages than if the defendants were exposed to punitive damages juclgrrlents
dividual suits by class members who were able to opt out of " or to
punitive damages at all. 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG
CLASS ACTIONS § 17.38, at 115 (3d ed. 1992).
14. Many other questions could be asked about mandatory punitive
ages classes. For example, one could examine whether and when due
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constitute a predicate for Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class certification, the
ability of courts to enter anti-suit injunctions against separate liti-
gation that would undermine mandatory punitive damages classes
takes on great importance.
II. LEGAL LIMITS ON LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Statutory and Common Law Limits
Because law-imposed limits on liability for punitive damages
are the linchpin of limited generosity classes, it is essential to un-
derstand what limits the law actually imposes. Several states have
legislated limits on the recovery of punitive damages. 15 Frequently,
the substantive caps on punitive damages liability form part oflegis-
lation that also mandates particular procedures to be utilized in
connection with the possible imposition of punitive damages liabil-
't 161 y.
A perusal ofAppendix A reveals that the caps one finds in legis-
lation tend to confine punitive damages to either a multiple of com-
pensatory damages (or to a multiple of a subset of compensatory
damages, such as "economic" damages) or to a specified number of
dollars. State legislation sometimes disallows punitive damages al-
together or in specified circumstances, such as those in which a
claimant elects to have her recovery multiplied under other statu-
tory authority. Some legislation requires that subsequent punitive
damages awards be reduced by the amount of earlier such awards
for the same act or course of conduct.
Further perusal of state legislation concerning punitive dam-
ages reveals that many provisions codify principles that initially
were developed by the courts as a matter of common law: principles
governing the legal wrongs for which and the circumstances under
which a person may be held liable for punitive damages, the mental
states that are threshold predicates for punitive damages liability,
and other factors that the trier of fact and reviewing judges should
consider in determining liability for punitive damages and their
amount.
requirements would preclude a particular court, or any court, from exercising
personal jurisdiction over all the persons who ought to be members of a manda-
tory punitive damages class, if that class is to serve the purposes for which it
would be certified. One could examine whether due process requirements
would preclude any court from certifying a punitive damages class which is
mandatory, that is, from which members could not "opt out." Both of these
questions were suggested by the Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, and neither has been authoritatively answered. 472 U.S. 797, 811-12
n.3 (1985) (expressly leaving open what due process requires in order to bind
members of classes other than Rule 23(b)(3) classes wholly or predominantly for
money damages). Such questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
15. See infra Appendix A (quoting a number of these pieces oflegislation).
16. [d.
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If a single state's substantive law governing punitive damages
applies to all of the claims presented in a class action, that simpli-
fies management of the class suit and facilitates equitable appor-
tionment of any capped award among the class members. On the
other hand, if, under applicable choice of law principles, different
bodies of substantive law govern punitive damages-if different caps
apply and some relevant bodies oflaw do not cap punitive damages
at all-with some members' claims being governed by one state's
law while other members' claims are governed by other states' laws,
the problems created go beyond administration to more fundamental
issues of equitable apportionment. One could conclude that it is eq-
uitable for class members who are factually similarly situated to re-
cover differing amounts of punitive damages if such differing
amounts are mandated by the law that constitutionally must or may
govern their claims.17 Whether such a regime would be consistent
with a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)-type class will be discussed below.is
As mentioned earlier, punitive damages legislation often pro-
vides procedural protections to defendants. Such provisions may:
1. impose special pleading rules;
2. condition or postpone a plaintiff's opportunity to discover
facts relevant only to a punitive damages award;
3. require the plaintiff to produce a specified measure of proof
of liability for compensatory damages, or obtain a verdict
that awards compensatory damages and is based on findings
of particular facts, before plaintiff may introduce evidence
pertinent only to a punitive damages award;
4. dictate the trier of fact on punitive damages;
5. allocate functions between trial judge and jury on related is-
sues;
6. require specific findings of fact by a judge who permits a jury
to consider punitive damages;
7. establish a burden of proof greater than preponderance of
the evidence for matters pertinent to a punitive damages
award, or specify burdens of proof when a defendant seeks to
be credited with amounts previously paid for punitive dam-
ages arising out of the same course of conduct as then in con-
troversy;
17. Choice of law principles are constrained by some constitutional, due
process, principles. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-23 (concluding that a class ac-
tion court must have "a 'significant contact or ... aggregation of contacts' to the
claims asserted by each [class] member, ... 'creating state interests,' to ensure
that the choice of [forum] law is not arbitrary or unfair," that the expectation of
the parties concerning governing law is an important consideration, and that
application of forum law to every claim in Shutts exceeded constitutional lim-
its); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-13 (1981) (articulating the
need for forum contacts that the Court applied in Shutts).
18. See infra notes 163-203 and accompanying text.
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8. authorize, or even mandate, separate trial of issues relating
to punitive damages, and address the admissibility of evi-
dence in each portion of such a bifurcated proceeding;
9. ordain what the jury mayor may not be informed as to the
substantive and procedural law pertaining to an award of
punitive damages; and
10. specify the judicial review that trial judges and appellate
judges must make of punitive damages awards, including the
factors such judges should consider, and impose fact-finding
responsibilities or other responsibilities triggered when a de-
fendant seeks to be credited with amounts previously paid
for punitive damages arising out of the same course of con-
duct as then in controversy.
While a state court usually is obliged to utilize the procedures
that have been promulgated or developed to govern the courts of
that state19 and ordinarily would not be bound, or even permitted, to
follow the procedural prescriptions attendant upon possible imposi-
tion of punitive damages enacted for another court system20 (just as
federal courts use the procedures promulgated or developed for their
use, even when hearing cases in which state substantive law gov-
erns the merits),21 state courts would be bound to enforce the sub-
19. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAy, CONFLICT OF LAWS 57 (2d ed. 1992)
(asserting that "a court will apply foreign law only to the extent that it deals
with the substance of the case, i.e., affects the outcome of the litigation, but will
rely on forum law to deal with the 'procedural' aspects of the litigation") (foot-
notes omitted). That leaves some maneuvering room in characterizing particu-
lar aspects of the law as substantive or procedural. See generally Walter
Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333 (1933) (discussing the drawing oflines between substantive and proce-
dural law).
20. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §
3.2C, at 59 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that part of territorially-oriented choice oflaw
analysis is to decide how much of the law selected by a choice of law rule should
be applied, indicating that what "is 'substantive' [is] to be governed by the law
selected by [choice] of law analysis, and what is 'procedural' is to be determined
by the law of the ... forum," as such). Weintraub argues, "[i]f ... the foreign
rule in issue is not especially difficult to find and apply and if there is any prob-
ability that the rule may affect the outcome, the rule should be considered as
'substantive' ...." Id. § 3.2C1, at 59; see also McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120,
1132 (11th Cir. 2001) (observing that "a finding that a matter is substantive or
procedural for Erie purposes does not compel the same characterization for
choice of law purposes").
21. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (holding that federal
courts are to apply valid Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and indicating by im-
plication that they should apply valid Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and
other such promulgated sets of procedural rules, even if the forum state uses
rules that conflict with the Federal Rules and the difference in rules may alter
the outcome of a case); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding
that federal courts must apply substantive state law, whether common law,
statutory or constitutional, where state law properly applies).
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stantive caps on punitive damages liability enacted by (or otherwise
the law in) other states when the substantive law of those states
governed, under applicable choice of law principles.22 Moreover,
given the difficulties that often attend the task of differentiating be-
tween substance and procedure, one easily can imagine that courts
may have trouble drawing the line between the aspects of sister-
state law concerning punitive damages awards that they must apply
22. Federal courts would be similarly bound. The obligation of federal
courts derives from the Erie line of cases, which also indicates the breadth of
federal courts' obligation. The obligation of state courts is to apply substantive
law that is selected consistently with the states' own choice of law principles
and that may constitutionally be applied, consistent with the due process
clause. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 US. 797, 821 (1985). "When
the forum's choice-of-Iaw rule refers to the law of another jurisdiction, the ques-
tions [may] arise[ ] as to the extent of that reference: does it include both the
foreign substantive and procedural law ... ?" SCOLES & HAy, supra note 19, at
57.
Moreover, when states must apply substantive federal law and enforce
federally-created rights, they sometimes also must apply "procedural baggage,"
so as not to undermine the substantive federal law. See Dice v. Akron, Canton
& Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding, inter alia, that in adju-
dicating an action arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a state
court had to send to the jury fact questions concerning the fraudulence of re-
leases-of-liability, notwithstanding contrary state practice). The characteriza-
tion of legal rules as substantive or procedural in the context of choice of law,
and the implications of those characterizations under the due process clause
and for purposes of full faith and credit obligations, also has come before the
Court on occasion. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988)
(holding that applying forum state statute of limitations. to a multi-state class
action violated neither full faith and credit nor due process); Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 517 (1953) (holding that forum state's application of
its own statute of limitations to claims arising under another state's statute did
not violate full faith and credit, even if the other state's limitations period was
built into its statute); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178,
183 (1936) (holding breach of contract defense created by foreign state statute
to be a substantive right, entitled to full faith and credit from forum state);
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397,410 (1930) (holding forum state's statute of
limitations that extinguished a contract right created in a foreign jurisdiction to
violate due process); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 328 (1839)
(holding foreign state judgment entitled to full faith and credit, while execution
of the judgment was governed by the law of the forum state); see generally
WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, §§ 9.2B, 9.3C, at 640 (commenting, inter alia, that
"[a] court ought not to be able to escape the mandate of full faith and credit
through the device of classifying the rule that it wishes to apply as 'proce-
dural''').
For a discussion of what full faith and credit requires in the choice of
law context, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-13 (1981) (plural-
ity opinion recognizing that the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause provide modest restrictions on choice oflaw); id. at 332-36 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (opining that due process prohibits application of a law that
is only casually or slightly related to the litigation; full faith and credit also re-
quires a forum to respect the law of other states, subject to the forum's own in-
terests in furthering its public policies). See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note
20, § 9.3.
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and those that they need not, and ought not, to apply.23
Whether or not applicable state law imposes a cap on punitive
damages, constitutional constraints set an upper limit.24 As the next
section demonstrates, some of the impulses that underlie the states'
substantive and the procedural constraints on punitive damages
awards also are reflected in the constitutional doctrine concerning
punitive damages tha~ the Supreme Court has articulated.
B. Constitutional Limits
Although this is not the place for a detailed examination of the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning Gonstitutionallimits on puni-
tive damages, a sketch of that jurisprudence is essential undergird-
ing for the discussion of mandatory class certification that follows.
In recent years, the Court has made decisions concerning the
demands of both procedural and substantive due process upon the
award of punitive damages. It also decided, back in 1973, that the
First Amendment has a role to play in limiting punitive damages: it
prohibits states from permitting the recovery of punitive damages
for defamation, unless liability is based on knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth, the standard of "malice" articulated
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 25 On the other hand, the Court
23. Indeed, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996),
provides an excellent example, by analogy. That case posed the question
whether, under the Erie doctrine, a federal district court, sitting in diversity,
was obliged to apply state law that empowered trial and appellate courts to re-
view the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when a jury award "devi-
ates materially from ... reasonable compensation," or whether such appellate
review would violate the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution. Id. at 668. That clause provides that "no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any ..." federal court "than according to the
rules of the common law." Id. The Court held that federal district court judges
should apply the state review standard (in effect, holding that standard to fall
on the substantive side of the substance/procedure divide, in order to avoid al-
lowing significantly larger recoveries in federal court than those that would
withstand scrutiny in the state courts), and that the Seventh Amendment
would not be violated so long as the federal appeals court reviewed the district
court decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 668-69. Gasperini
is not binding on the states, which operate outside the Erie regime, but it sug-
gests that matters that go to the quantification of punitive damages should not
be treated as procedural for conflicts purposes.
24. As to the constitutional limits on punitive damages, see infra notes 25-
72 and accompanying text.
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-
50 (1974). The Court in Gertz noted that punitive damages are not compensa-
tion for injury but "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensi-
ble conduct and to deter its future occurrence." Id. at 350. Such damages exac-
erbate the danger of media self-censorship and are irrelevant to the state
interest in compensating individuals for injury to reputation. As a result, the
policies that permit liability for compensatory damages under a less demanding
standard than knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth do not
apply to punitive damages. See id.
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has held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
does not constrain punitive damages awards in civil cases between
private parties, because that Clause "was intended to limit only
those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.,,26
The Court addressed both substantive and procedural due proc-
ess challenges to punitive damages awards in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip27 and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp.28 In Haslip, the Court concluded, among other things,
that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages-
under which the amount of the award is initially made by a jury in-
structed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter
similar wrongful conduct, and the jury's determination is reviewed
for reasonableness-"is [not] so inherently unfair as to deny due
process and be per se unconstitutional.,,29 The Court disclaimed abil-
ity to "draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable,,,30 but advised that
"general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the
court ... properly enter into the constitutional calculus.,,31 Review-
ing the constitutionality of the award in Haslip, the Court concluded
that: (1) the fact that, under state law, punitive damages were im-
posed for purposes of retribution and deterrence did not render them
violative of the Due Process Clause;32 (2) instructions that informed
the jury of punitive damages' nature and purpose, required the jury
to consider the character and degree of the wrong, and explained
that their imposition was not compulsory, sufficiently confined the
jury's discretion;33 (3) state supreme court case law that specified
factors for trial and appellate courts to consider when scrutinizing
punitive damages awards ensured meaningful and adequate review
and imposed a "sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on
the discretion of Alabama factfinders,,;34 and (4) the state supreme
court's review ensured that punitive damages awards were "not
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and ha[d]
some understandable relationship to compensatory damages,,,35 by
using standards providing "a rational relationship in determining
whether a particular award is greater than reasonably necessary to
punish and deter.,,36 Where defendant had received the benefit of all
these procedural protections, the award was not unconstitutional al-
26. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
(1989).
27. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
28. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
29. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-17.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 19-20.
34. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991).
35. Id.
36. Id.
2001] LIMITED GENEROSITY CLASSES 1055
though it was more than four times the amount of compensatory
damages awarded, more than 200 times Haslip's out-of-pocket ex-
penses, and far in excess of the fine that could have been imposed
under state statutes governing insurance fraud (which was involved
there).37
In TXO, the Court again affirmed a punitive damages award,
this one 526 times the actual damages awarded by the jury.38 Three
Justices reaffirmed the approach taken in Haslip, rejecting the par-
ticular tests proposed by the parties for determining whether a pu-
nitive damages award is grossly excessive and presumptively uncon-
stitutional, one a rational basis standard, the other a heightened
scrutiny approach that encompassed application of specified "objec-
tive" criteria.39 In examining the particular award being challenged,
these Justices advised, "[i]t is appropriate to consider the magnitude
of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have
caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as
well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted
if similar future behavior were not deterred.,,40 The disparity be-
tween the punitive award and the potential harm that defendant
threatened did not jar the Court's constitutional sensibilities,41 par-
ticularly in light of defendant's wealth and the jury's ability to have
determined reasonably that defendant acted maliciously and fraudu-
lently, in bad faith, and that the scheme employed was part of a lar-
ger pattern of fraud and deceit.42 A plurality of the Justices refused
to hold the trial judge's failure to articulate the basis of his denial of
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur
to be constitutional violations and rejected other arguments concern-
37. Id. at 23-24.
38. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
39. Id. at 455-58. Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, expressed a preference for a constitutional inquiry that would not
focus on the amount of money a jury awards but on its reasons, so that a puni-
tive award that reflects bias, passion, or prejudice, rather than a rational con-
cern for deterrence and retribution, would be unconstitutional. On the facts, he
found sufficient evidence of willful and malicious conduct by the defendant, and
sufficient reason to believe that the jury was motivated to punish and deter
TXO, that he voted to affirm the award. Id. at 467-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment and took
the view that the due process challenges had to fail because the jury had been
instructed on the purposes of punitive damages under state law and its award
had been reviewed for reasonableness. These Justices rejected the view that
due process contains a substantive right not to be subjected to excessive puni-
tive damages. Id. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
O'Connor dissented in an opinion joined by Justice White, and parts of which
were joined by Justice Souter. In brief, she favored more rigorous standards
and believed that neither the size of the award here nor the procedures that
produced it were consistent with the principles of Haslip. Id. at 473 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
41. See id. at 462.
42. Id.
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ing the adequacy of the state court review of the award.43 A plural-
ity also shared the view that, "the notice component of the Due
Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a puni-
tive damages award might be imposed in response to egregiously
tortious conduct,,,44 which state law did here. Reading the case nar-
rowly to stand only for the propositions which a majority of the Jus-
tices supported,45 it speaks only to procedural, not substantive, due
process.
However, more recently in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,46 the
Court, in an opinion joined by seven Justices, firmly stated that its
recent cases had recognized "that the Constitution imposes a sub-
stantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards.,,47 Focusing
here, however, not on the standard that will identify unconstitu-
tionally excessive awards but on the procedures necessary to ensure
that punitive damages are not imposed arbitrarily, the Court held
violative of due process an Oregon constitutional prohibition against
judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a
jury, except where the court finds no evidence to support the ver-
dict.48 The Court found that "(j]udicial review of the size of punitive
damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for
as long as punitive damages have been awarded,'049 and continues to
so operate in every other state, while Oregon provides "no procedure
for reducing or setting aside" a punitive damages award as excessive
or arbitrary in amount.50 The Court then held that Oregon's abroga-
tion of this well-established common-law protection against arbi-
trary deprivations of property, without providing any substitute pro-
cedure and without having concluded that the danger of arbitrary
awards had subsided, violated due process.51 The Court rejected the
adequacy of other supposed safeguards provided by Oregon: a limi-
tation of punitive damages to the amount specified in the complaint,
a requirement of clear and convincing proof, a "pre-verdict determi-
nation of maximum allowable punitive awards" (which the Court
found was not made by Oregon courts), and proper jury instruc-
43. Id. at 465.
44. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.s. 443, 465-66 (1993).
45. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that the hold-
ing of a fragmented Court reflects the narrowest grounds of concurrence in the
judgment); DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397,418-19 (2d
Cir. 2001); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 2000), petition
for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3036 (U.S. May 24, 2001) (No. 00-1766); Fernandes v.
Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that lower
federal courts should give effect to the narrowest ground on which a majority of
Justices agree when they issue a plurality opinion).
46. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
47. Id. at 420.
48. See id. at 418, 420.
49. Id. at 421.
50. Id. at 427-29.
51. Id. at 431-32.
2001] LIMITED GENEROSITY CLASSES 1057
tions.52
53 -In BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court returned to
the standards for identifying unconstitutionally excessive awards,
while also addressing matters of procedural due process, and held a
$2 million punitive damages award to one automobile purchaser to
be grossly excessive, in violation of due process.54 The decision is of
particular relevance to mass tort claims. The punitive damages
award in Gore had been imposed in response to BMW's nationwide
policy of not advising its dealers or their customers of pre-delivery
damage to new cars when the cost of repair did not exceed 3% of the
car's suggested retail price.55 However, the award was made to the
purchaser of but one of the affected cars. Emphasizing that gross
excessiveness must be judged in relation to a state's legitimate in-
terests in punishing and deterring conduct and that, consistent with
principles of state sovereignty and comity, one state may not impose
its policy choices on other states, the Court concluded that the eco-
nomic penalties a state inflicts, including punitive damages, must be
supported by the state's interest in protecting its own consumers
and economy, and may not be used to protect the consumers or
economies of other states.56 The Court concluded that the sanction
imposed was too severe to satisfy due process,57 in light of this cir-
cumscription of the jury's field of vision and several other factors:
the low degree of reprehensibility of BMW's conduct found by the
Court,58 the very high ratio of the punitive damages award to the
52. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1994).
53. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
54. Id. at 575.
55. Id. at 563-64,567-68 n.11, 573.
56. Id. at 568-74, The Court observed that "a State may not impose eco-
nomic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfea-
sors' lawful conduct in other States," and that an attempt by Alabama to alter
BMW's nationwide policy through the imposition of a punitive damages award
would infringe on the policy choices of other states. Id. at 572. Thus, Alabama
lacked "power" to punish BMW for conduct lawful where it occurred and that
had no impact on Alabama or its residents, or to impose punitive damages on
BMW in an effort to deter it from conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 572-73.
57. See id. at 585-86. Four Justices dissented. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, reiterated their view that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause is not a repository of substantive guarantees against the unfair-
ness of a punitive damages award. See id. at 598-607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented for reasons in-
cluding the Alabama Supreme Court's already having made clear the impropri-
ety of assessing punitive damages by reference to out-of-state occurrences not
shown to be unlawful, and the ill-equippedness of the Court to correct misappli-
cation of properly stated rules of law concerning punitive damages. See id. at
607-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-80 (citing, inter alia, the purely economic na-
ture of the harm done to plaintiff, the reasonableness of BMW's views that dis-
closure requirements did not demand disclosure of minor repairs in the absence
of state court determinations to the contrary and that omission of such disclo-
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plaintiffs compensatory damages award,59 the great difference be-
tween the former award and the sanctions that Alabama and other
states imposed for misconduct similar to that of BMW's,60 the ab-
sence of reason to believe that a more modest sanction would not
have been sufficient,6I and the fact that BMW was not on notice that
it might be subjected to a multimillion dollar sanction for its con-
duct-a conclusion that had its roots, in part, in the Court's limita-
tion of the scope of the wrong that Alabama courts could punish.62
Finally, in May, 2001, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc.,63 eschewing substantive due process review of a
$4.5 million punitive damages award imposed in connection with a
$50,000 verdict for compensatory damages64 and leaving that review
to be re-done on re:mand, the Court decided as a matter of proce-
dural due process that a court of appeals should review de novo a
district court's determination of the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award,65-while deferring to findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous.66 The Court reversed the court of appeals' use
sures was not fraudulent because the matter omitted was not material, the ab·
sence of evidence that BMW acted in bad faith, the absence of evidence that
BMW persisted in a course of conduct after it had been adjudged unlawful, and
the absence of deliberately false statements or concealment of improper motiva-
tion).
59. Id. at 580-83 (emphasizing that the punitive award was 500 times the
amount of actual harm to the plaintiff, as found by the jury, and that no addi-
tional harm was threatened). In dicta, the Court commented, however, that a
higher ratio of punitive to compensatory damages may be supportable if "a par-
ticularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic dam-
ages" or when injuries are hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harmis difficult to determine. Id. at 582.
60. Id. at 583-85.
61. Id. at 584-85.
62. See id. at 574-75, 585.
63. 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
64. See id. at 1682 (indicating that the Court had chosen not to grant the
petition for writ of certiorari insofar as it sought review of the punitive award
under the criteria that the Court previously had announced).
65. That is, review de novo the district court's application ofthe test elabO-
rated by the Court in BMW. See Leatherman, 121 S. Ct. at 1688 n.14.
66. Leatherman, 121 S. Ct. at 1688 n.14. Note, however, that clear error is
the standard of review typically used by federal courts to review findings offact
by a judge; findings of fact by a jury normally receive even greater deference.
See, e.g., FED. R. CN. P. 52(a) (stating that findings of fact by the court "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous"). By contrast, judgment as a matter
of law, after a jury verdict, is to be granted only if there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as it did. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
50(a), (b). A motion for a new trial, however, typically may be granted, based on
conduct of the jury, if a jury verdict "appears to be against the weight of the
evidence or is legally excessive or inadequate in amount." JACK H.
FRIEOENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 575 (3d ed. 1999) (citations omitted); see
also Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir.) (indicating that a jury's d~­
termination of damages should not. be disturbed if there is any legitimate baSIS
in the evidence to support it), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967); Lewis v. Bd. of
Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1139 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing
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of an abuse of discretion standard of review where appellant had ar-
gued that the award of punitive damages was grossly excessive, in
violation of its due process rights.67 The Court grounded its decision
on what its own practice has been, that is, independently and non-
deferentially examining the relevant criteria for determining
whether a punitive damages award is excessive.68 More importantly,
the Court relied upon the policies that underlie the selection of a
standard of review. In the latter regard, the Court looked to (1) the
need for appellate courts to give substantive content to the concept
of "gross excessiveness" by applying it in particular contexts,
thereby clarifying and controlling that principle;69 (2) the policy-
making aspects of punitive damages awards that distinguish them
from pure fact-findings;7o and (3) the relative competencies of trial
and appellate judges to evaluate punitive damages awards.71 Al-
though the Court had denied certiorari insofar as petitioners sought
review of the punitive award under the substantive due process cri-
teria the Court previously had announced, the Court commented
upon errors of law that the district court appeared to have made in
its jury instructions and otherwise, ostensibly to illustrate why the
standard of review might affect the outcome of this case.72 The
Court then remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration of
the case under the proper standard of review.
Duncan, and adding that a court nonetheless has a duty to grant a new trial,
when a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, to prevent a miscarriage of
justice). In Leatherman, the punitive damages award had been made by a jury.
121 S. Ct. at 1680.
67. Leatherman, 121 S. Ct. at 1682-83.
68. [d. at 1684-85.
69. [d. at 1685-86.
70. [d. at 1686-87. The Court distinguished here between the notion that
determinations of punitive damages should be left to juries because those de-
terminations are fact-sensitive, and the notion that "the amount of punitive
damages imposed . . . is itself a 'fact' within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment's Re-examination Clause." [d. at 1686 n.ll; see supra note 23 (ex-
plaining that the Re-examination Clause prohibits federal courts from re-
examining any fact tried by a jury except according to the rules of the common
law).
The Court also responded to the argument that the Court's decision in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), rested on the assumption that
punitive damages awards are findings of fact. See supra notes 46-52 and ac-
companying text. Although the Court in Honda had held that an Oregon con-
stitutional provision that prohibited the re-examination of any fact tried by a
jury violated due process because it disallowed review of the constitutionality of
punitive damages awards, the Leatherman Court sought to undercut the appar-
ent inconsistency by contending that it was the Oregon Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the state constitution that compelled the Court to treat punitive
damages as "covered" by the prohibition on re-examination. Leatherman, 121 S.
Ct. at 1686 n.10.
71. Leatherman, 121 S. Ct. at 1687-88.
72. [d. at 1688-89.
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III. Do SUCH LEGAL LIMITS CONSTITUTE APREDICATE FOR RULE
23(b)(1)(B) CLASS CERTIFICATION?
Insofar as legislatures or courts impose firm, aggregate, limita-
tions on a defendant's liability for particular conduct or a particular
course of conduct, at first glance the situation presented would seem
to fall squarely within the language of and the policies underlying
Rule 23(b)(1)(B): the prosecution of separate actions by individual
members of the class of persons injured by that conduct or course of
conduct would create a risk of adjudications that would, as a practi-
cal matter, dispose of the interests of other members who were not
parties to the earlier adjudications or substantially impair or im-
pede the ability of those other members to protect their interests.
However, we must examine whether the case antecedents of Rule
23(b)(1)(B) and the cases decided under that Rule authorize such
class actions. This examination reveals a minefield of issues.
A. Case Antecedents to Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
None of the case antecedents of (b)(l)(B) class certification cited
by the Supreme Court in its important 1999 decision in Ortiz v. Fi-
breboard Corp.73 appear to have involved a law-imposed limit on li-
ability. None of the case antecedents of (b)(l)(B) class certification
that I found involved a law-imposed (as opposed to an assets-
insufficiency) limit on liability, either.74 Perhaps the closest histori-
cal antecedent of limited fund (b)(l)(B) classes were creditors' and
legatees' bills whose purposes included ensuring equality of treat-
ment among creditors.75 The task in these cases was to compare to-
tal claims with total assets and proportionately to reduce the former
in the event of insufficient assets. 76 Common interests in ferreting
out the assets usually were viewed as predominating over any con-
73. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the
Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998) (tracing the Eng-
lish antecedents of the class suit, and American doctrine, in both federal and
state courts, both before 1853 and in time periods up through the decision of
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940».
75. See id. at 1886-93, 1915-16. The Ortiz Court also described, as classic
examples of cases involving risk of impairment to the interest of persons not
parties,
suits brought to reorganize fraternal-benefit societies, ... actions by
shareholders to declare a dividend or otherwise to "fix [their] rights," .
. . and actions charging "a breach of trust by an indenture trustee or
other fiduciary similarly affecting the members of a large class" of
beneficiaries, requiring an accounting or similar procedure "to restore
the subject ofthe trust.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 833-34 (citations omitted). None of these seem more similar
to limited generosity classes than the limited fund, an example of suits "involv-
ing 'the presence of property which call[ed] for distribution or management.'''
Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
76. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1890.
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£licts among creditorsllegatees, and thus as justifying a representa-
tive suit to collect the assets and regulate their distribution.77 Start-
ing in the late 1820s, these cases came to be viewed as "in rem," a
characterization that, at the time, shifted the basis of the court's au-
thority away from the joinder of parties other than a representative
and to the existence of a "res" before the court. 78
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that
classic instances of limited funds were exemplified by situations in
which a group of claimants asserted aggregate claims that ''would
deplete a fixed sum ofmoney.,,79 It views class certification pursuant
to the limited generosity theory as resembling traditional limited
fund class actions more closely than limited assets classes resemble
such traditional actions,8o explaining that "[w]ith respect to aggre-
gate claims in excess ofa fixed sum of money, a (b)(l)(B) class action
is appropriate to avoid an unfair preference for the early claim-
77. Id. at 1891.
78. See id. at 1887-90. Today, of course, under Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), the characterization as in rem does not "do the same work" as it once did
in satisfying due process requirements concerning notice/opportunity to be
heard, and it may not "do the same work" as it earlier did in creating the mini-
mum contacts necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over interested parties
so that the court can make a binding adjudication of their rights and interests
in the property. In Mullane, the Court made clear that the characterization of
an action as in rem or in personam does not alter· the need to afford to those
whose interests will be affected such notice and opportunity to be heard as due
process requires, and that notice by publication often will not suffice. See Mul-
lane, 339 U.S. at 310-15. In Shaffer, the Court concluded that, even when ac-
tions are quasi-in-rem, a court cannot assert jurisdiction over defendants whose
interests in that property are at stake, absent minimum contacts between the
defendants and the forum state. In dicta, the Court indicated that the same
would be true in in rem cases, although the presence of the seized property in
the forum state might create sufficient contacts to render the assertion ofjuris-
diction constitutional. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08; id. at 217 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 218 (Stevens, J. concurring). This in rem categorization
nonetheless has been important in connection with class action courts' ability to
enjoin actions that would interfere with their jurisdiction. See infra notes 218-
22 and accompanying text.
79. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 735 (2d Cir.
1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
80. The court said:
Though the potential amount of aggregate punitive damages had not
yet been determined, that amount was finite .... The (b)(l)(B) class
was thought appropriate because the recoveries of early successful
claimants for punitive damages would quickly reach a total sufficient
to assure deterrence, thereby precluding later claimants as a matter
oflaw.
Id. at 736-37. Accord Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 9, at 2021 ("At least in the
mass tort context, ... where the number of claimants is large, the pool of avail-
able punitive damages dollars is a classic limited fund warranting 'limited pun-
ishment' through Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification for a single punitive damages
trial or a comprehensive settlement ofpunitive damages liability.").
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ants,,,81 whereas "insolvency does not present the classic instance of
a 'limited fund.",82 The Second Circuit has found that certification of
a mandatory class when the defendant is insolvent poses very sub-
stantial questions about the circumvention of bankruptcy law-and-
protections, and even more substantial questions when the claims of
creditors vis-a.-vis one another would be involved.83 ,
Thus, it may be that the early creditors' and legatees' bills, and
other early limited fund class actions,84 more closely resemble a lim-
ited generosity class than they do the modern limited fund class ac-
tion predicated on insolvency. Certainly, nothing I saw in the ante-
cedents to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) appears to be inconsistent with, much
less preclusive of, limited generosity classes. Nonetheless, insofar
as my research did not turn up early cases involving legal limits be-
cause such cases did not exist, the absence of such cases could pose
an obstacle to (b)(l)(B) class certifications if the courts closely ob-
serve, and narrowly construe, the warning in Ortiz that the classic
characteristics of (b)(l)(B) classes are presumptively necessary.85
B. Cases Decided Under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
If one focuses upon cases decided under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), one
finds that, while most are limited fund cases,86 several have dis-
cussed, and a few have embraced, limited generosity theory. These
latter cases (and others, in which punitive damages awards were
challenged by defendants) often marshall the arguments for manda-
tory punitive damages classes. From defendants' or the courts' per-
spective, it is said that multiple punitive damages awards are exces-
. 87 d' 1 t thO l' 88 1 89 d 90slve an VIO a e some mg-po ICy, common aw, ue process,
81. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d at 735.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 736-39.
84. The Ortiz Court cites, as examples of classic limited fund class actions,
suits on behalf of "claimants to trust assets, a bank account, insurance pro-
ceeds, company assets in a liquidation sale, [and] proceeds of a ship sale in a
maritime accident suit." Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834 (1999) (ci-
tations omitted).
85. Id. at 842.
86. 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 13, § 4.09, at 4-31.
87. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir.
1967) (expressing grave difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive dam-
ages in a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation could be administered so
as to avoid "overkill" in a mass tort case, unless there were a way in which all
cases could be assembled before a single court, where a jury could make one
award for "appropriate distribution among all successful plaintiffs"); Campbell
v. ACandS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (D. Mont. 1989) (failing to persuade
the court that liability for punitive damages should not go to the jury, defen-
dants had argued for a holding as a matter of law that further imposition of pu-
nitive damages upon them in asbestos litigation in Montana would be unrea-
sonable and excessive because, on the facts, deterrence would not be fostered
and defendant had been adequately punished); In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (observ-
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protections against double jeopardy 91 or the Excessive Fines Clause
ofthe Eighth Amendment,92 and that less extreme measures to com-
ing that a series of separate actions arising out of a mass tort may result in dis-
proportionate punishment of the defendant), vacated by 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub nom. AH. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
88. See, e.g., Campbell, 704 F. Supp. at 1021-22 (concluding that the pro-
priety of a punitive award rests with the trier of fact, the court rejected the de-
fendants' argument that public policy dictated that multiple punitive damages
awards that would lead to its virtual demise as a viable commercial enterprise
not be permitted); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems.
Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying mandamus petition to vacate certifica-
tion order), cert. denied, 465 U.s. 1067 (1984) (opining that there must be some
limit, as a matter of policy or due process, to the number of times defendants
may be punished for a single transaction).
89. See, e.g., Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898 (stating that there "is an
implied in law ceiling on the amount of punitive damages that may be as-
sessed"), vacated by 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
90. See, e.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 901 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.)
(rejecting defendant's arguments that a second award of punitive damages
would violate due process where the first such award did not necessarily aim to
punish the defendant for the full extent of its misconduct and the record neither
supported the argument that prior awards approached the limit due process
would impose nor demonstrated that the same misconduct had been the focus of
prior actions; in addition, rejecting a procedural due process challenge based on
the standards given to the jury, the use of a preponderance of the evidence bur-
den of proof, and the judicial oversight employed), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S.
1057 (1990); Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Haw. 1989) (reject-
ing defendant's arguments that an award of punitive damages would violate
due process where meaningful standards limited the award, defendants were
not being repeatedly punished for a single act but for a series of acts and deci-
sions over decades, involving repeated failures to conform to their duties, there
was no evidence that a prior punitive award was based on the full extent of de-
fendant's misconduct, and the court was concerned with under-deterring such
conduct); Campbell, 704 F. Supp. at 1023-24 (rejecting defendant's arguments
that an award of punitive damages would violate due process because the sub-
stantive state standard for such damages was void for vagueness and, coupled
with bias against corporations, increased juries' tendencies to take from the rich
and give to the poor); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899 (opining that the in-
terests underlying the due process rights of defendants can constitute an inter-
est warranting the limitation or even elimination of multiple punitive damages
awards, and that defendants have a due process right to be protected against
unlimited multiple punishment for the same act, because such violates funda-
mental fairness), vacated by 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
91. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1004 (3d Cir.) (noting
that the parallel between exposure of mass tort defendants to repetitious puni-
tive damages awards and fines for criminal activities has led some courts and
commentators to suggest that the concepts of double jeopardy and excessive
punishment should be invoked), cert. denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Sch.
Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 852 (1986), and cert. denied sub nom. National
Gypsum Co. v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); 2 AM. LAw INST.,
REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 260
(1991) (concluding that repeatedly penalizing corporate defendants for a single
wrongful judgment or action is "antithetical to the protection against double
jeopardy that characterizes overtly penal regimes").
92. See, e.g., Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1355, 1363 (5th
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bat the foregoing evils are ineffectual and create problems of their
own.
93 From the courts' or plaintiffs' collective perspective,94 it is
Cir. 1989) (involving a challenge to a punitive damages award as violative of
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause), stay on damages granted, 494 U.S.
1023 (1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 914 (1991) (requiring damages to be re-evaluated
consistently with Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)), damages
award affd, 934 F.2d 1377 (1991); Kraus v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., 878 F.2d
1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving a challenge to a punitive damages award
as violative of Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause), cert. dismissed, 493
U.S. 1051 (1990); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 622 (7th Cir. 1989)
(involving a challenge to a punitive damages award as violative of Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990). How-
ever, the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
rejected the argument that punitive damages awards in civil litigation between
private parties can violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment. 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989).
Similar reasoning would likely rebut the contention of a violation of
double jeopardy. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (holding
double jeopardy protections to apply only to multiple criminal actions); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) (holding protections against double
jeopardy not to be "triggered by litigation between private parties"). Defen-
dants also may have additional reasons that they do not publicize to favor the
certification of mandatory punitive damages classes. See supra note 13.
93. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386-87 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc),
modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993) (observing that courts have recognized, with
some frustration, that no single court or state legislature can effectively respond
to the punitive damages problems created by mass exposure to defective prod-
ucts, and that to preclude any particular plaintiff from recovering punitive
damages is arbitrary, particularly when other courts and other state legisla-
tures may permit later-coming plaintiffs to recover such damages), cert. denied
sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 510 U.s. 1031 (1993); Sch.
Asbestos, 789 F.2d at 999, 1001 (noting that attempts by single states to impose
equitable apportionment are discouraged by the lack of assurance that other
states will do the same and by potential unfairness to their own citizenry); Juz-
win v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1234-36 (D.N.J. 1989) (on re-
consideration, vacating order striking plaintiffs claims for punitive damages
against any defendant who presented proof that it already had paid an award of
punitive damages for the same wrongful course of conduct), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 896 (1990). In Juzwin, the initial order had been entered on the grounds
that multiple awards in such circumstances violated defendants' due process
rights. On reconsideration, the court concluded that the remedy provided was
unworkable, citing the lack of timely notice to those who were adversely af-
fected, the inability of the court to determine whether the conditions necessary
to bar a plaintiff from asserting a punitive damages claim had been met, the
court's inability to provide uniform treatment to similarly situated plaintiffs
outside its jurisdiction, and its inability to protect the due process rights of de-
fendants not to have repetitive punitive damage awards made against them.
Accord AM. LAw INST., REpORTERS' STUDY, supra note 91, at 261, 265
(for similar reasons supporting a federal legislative authorization of mandatory
class actions for punitive damages arising out of mass torts). The ALI Report-
ers' Study concluded that single-state action is ineffectual because one state
cannot control what others do, and states that limit the recovery of punitive
damages while other states do not do so may act at the expense of their own
citizens, "a situation that hardly provides much law reform incentive for state
legislators." Id. at 261; see also Howard M. Erichson, Enough is Enough, SolV-
ing the Problem of Punitive Overkill in Multiple-Plaintiff Litigation, 152
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said that such mandatory classes are the best, and probably the
only, way to achieve distributive justice among similarly situated
plaintiffs and effect an equitable allocation of punitive damages,
rather than provide a windfall to some plaintiffs, to the detriment of
other plaintiffs.95 For all of these reasons, an all-inclusive manda-
tory punitive damages class often is seen as the best solution.96
Despite the strong appeal of these arguments, limited generos-
ity theory actually has provided the rationale for certifying few class
actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). In In re Agent Orange Product Li-
N.J.L.J. 246 (1998) (opining that bifurcation of trials, keeping defendant's
wealth and past punitive awards out of evidence until defendant's liability and
the award of compensatory damages have been decided, and perhaps even until
liability for punitive damages has been established, "offers a partial but inade-
quate solution to concerns about informing jurors of past punitive awards").
94. Some individual plaintiffs benefit from a system in which those first to
judgment gain a disproportionate amount of the punitive damages awarded.
95. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir.
1967) (speaking of the unfairness of unequal distributions' among equally wor-
thy plaintiffs); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (observing that, if no class were certified under (b)(l)(B), per-
sons who opted out of the (b)(3) compensatory damages class could receive all of
the punitive damages or none at all); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898 (pre-
dicting that an award of punitive damages in one case will alter the potential
recovery of a plaintiff in a later suit, because the first amount awarded may
represent an implied finding of the maximum amount that the defendant may
be punished); see also 2 AM. LAW INST., REpORTERS' STUDY, supra note 91, at 261
(noting that systems that give the lion's share of punitive damages to the first
victim to judgment are unfair to subsequent plaintiffs and may provide too little
deterrence).
Because plaintiffs, in theory, are fully compensated by compensatory
damages, recovery of any punitive damages is, in some sense, a windfall. How-
ever, when "windfall" is used in the context of punitive damages, it generally
refers to inequitable distribution such that some plaintiffs recover punitive
damages, or an amount of punitive damages, that is disproportionately great as
compared with the punitive damages received by others who are equally "de-
serving." See Briggs L. Tobin, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a Uni-
form Choice ofLaw Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive
Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 458 n.10, 464-
65 (1989) (so indicating, while also noting that punitive damages also can be
seen as a windfall to the extent that they are highly disproportionate to a com-
pensatory damages award).
96. See, e.g., Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 900 (opining that the class ac-
tion is the best device available to protect the interests of all parties where de-
fendant otherwise runs the risk of multiple punitive damages awards for the
same acts); see also 2 AM. LAw INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 91, at 262-
65 (advocating mandatory class, actions for punitive damages arising out of
large-scale mass torts, to determine and distribute an appropriate amount of
punitive damages for all tort claims arising out of the defendant's single course
of conduct). In so advocating, the Reporters' Study agreed with recommenda-
tions in the Report of the Special Committee on Punitive Damages, Section ,of
Litigation, American Bar Association, Punitive Damages: A Constructive Ex-
amination 71-85 (1986), and the American College of Trial Lawyers, Report on
Punitive Damages of the Committee on Special Problems in the Administration
ofJustice 20-26 (1989).
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ability Litigation,97 in support of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification of a
punitive damages class, along with the certification of a Rule
23(b)(3) certification of a compensatory damages class, Chief Judge
Weinstein found that: (1) there was a substantial probability that
punitive damages would be recoverable; (2) division of such an
award among all who ultimately recovered compensatory damages
would be equitable; (3) without a mandatory class certification, per-
sons who opted out might receive either all of the recoverable puni-
tive damages or none at all; and (4) "There must ... be some limit,
either as a matter of policy or as a matter of due process, to the
amount[sic] of times defendants may be punished for a single trans-
action.,,98 On these bases, he certified a (b)(l)(B) class for punitive
damages.
As this description shows, Chief Judge Weinstein was unclear
about the source of the limit on multiple punitive damages awards
for "a single transaction." He also did not address in this opinion
whether or how a single "policy" applied to limit the claims of this
more-than-nationwide class of Vietnam War veterans99 and their
family members, who sued under state laws to recover damages for
injuries allegedly suffered asa result of the veterans' exposure to
herbicides in Vietnam. In the portion of his opinion dealing with
Rule 23(b)(3) certification of a class insofar as it sought other-than-
punitive damages, Chief Judge Weinstein opined that sufficient con-
sensus existed in the substantive law of the states to provide a "na-
tional substantive rule" governing the main issues in the case. lOO It
is unclear whether Chief Judge Weinstein believed that there was a
parallel similarity in the punitive damages laws of the states that
would avoid choice-of-Iaw problems in the context of a (b)(l)(B) puni-
tive damages class. lOl The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
97. 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Dia-
mond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984).
98. Id. at 728.
99. The plaintiff class was defined to include persons who were in the
United States,' New Zealand or Australian armed forces during a specified time
period, who were injured in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange or
certain other herbicides, and family members directly or derivatively injured as
a result. Id. at 729.
100. Id. at 724.
101. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 705-13
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan,
465 U.s. 1067 (1984). Chief Judge Weinstein opined that a national consensus
or federal law would govern punitive damages in the case. Reasoning that the
states of the veterans' domiciles were concerned solely with compensating the
injured victims, he concluded that the only jurisdictions with interests in the
assessment of punitive damages, relevant for choice-of-Iaw purposes, were the
United States, the defendant corporations' states of incorporation and principal
places of business, the states of product manufacture, and locations where de-
fendants' "conspiracy of silence" may have had effect. Because Chief Judge
Weinstein found no reasonable way to choose among these various states' laws,
and an overriding federal interest in the assessment of punitive damages, he
2001] LIMITED GENEROSITY CLASSES 1067
affirmed, in the sense that it declined to grant mandamus to vacate
the (b)(1)(B) and (b)(3) certifications. l02 Its opinion on the manda-
mus denial did suggest agreement with Chief Judge Weinstein's
reasoning that the likely inability of some plaintiffs to recover puni-
tive damages (absent class certification), because of the likely re-
fusal of future juries to make multiEle punitive damages awards,
justified the mandatory certification. 03 The case later settled and,
when the appeals court heard the appeal challenging the class set-
tlement, it affirmed, but did so without specifically approving the
·t· d I 104pUll! lve amages c ass.
More recently, the District of Alaska certified a mandatory pu-
nitive damages class predicated on the limited generosity theory in a
case involving the Exxon Valdez oil spill. l05 The court also stayed
any other proceedings for punitive damages, brought by class mem-
bers. lOG The action was tried to a jury in a three-phase trial. The
first phase determined recklessness; the second assessed the
amount of compensatory damages attributable to the spill, to guide
the jury in fixing punitive damages; and the third culminated in a
$5 billion punitive damages award. l07 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently vacated the district court's allocation plan
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the court's holdings,
but nothing in its decision was critical of the class certification.loB
concluded that application of a federal law or national consensus law was justi-
fied. Id.
102. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858,862 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
103. Id. (finding that evidence of prior punitive damages payments might
induce juries to reduce such damages to later claimants and concluding there-
fore that "adjudication with respect to individual members of the class . . .
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudication," quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
100 F.R.D. 718, 725 (1983». The Second Circuit also concluded that, in light of
the large number of potential claimants and because punitive damages ought to
be distributed among plaintiffs on a basis other than their date of judgment,
mandamus was not justified. See id. at 861-62.
104. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 167, cert. denied sub nom. Pinkney v. Dow,
484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (specifically finding that, because the court's disposition
excluded any possibility of an award of punitive damages, the court did not need
to address the propriety of the certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B».
105. See In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the
certification, ordered by the district court on April 19, 1994); Cabraser & Sobol,
supra note 9, at 2022 (reporting that the order was predicated on limited pu:h-
ishment theory, citing In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), 1995
WL 527990, at *9 (D. Alaska 1995».
106. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 9, at 2022 (citing In re The Exxon Valdez,
No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), Order No. 180 Supplement at 1 (D. Alaska Mar. 8,
1994». For further discussion of such anti-suit injunctions, see infra notes 205-
94 and accompanying text.
107. In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d at 793-94.
108. The court vacated the allocation plan because the district court errone-
ously failed to enforce a cede back agreement between Exxon and certain plain-
tiffs, and erroneously instructed the jury about that agreement. Id. at 795-801.
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For a variety of reasons, certification predicated on the limited
generosity theory has been declined in a greater number of cases.
Although the district court was persuaded to certify a limited gener-
osity class in the Dalkon Shield litigation,109 the Court ofAppeals for
the Ninth Circuit vacated thatorder, at the behest of plaintiffs. In
addition to finding Rule 23(a) problems that (it held) precluded certi-
fication,no the court held (b)(1)(B) certification of the punitive dam-
ages class to be erroneous because the record did not demonstrate
that separate punitive damages awards inescapably would affect
later such awards. 111 Finding that "no rule of law limits the amount
of punitive damages a jury may award,,,112 that no traditional limited
fund of assets had been proven, and that a class action is not the
only way to protect a defendant from liability for unreasonable puni-
tive damages, the court vacated the (b)(1)(B) certification.n As
other commentators have pointed out,
109. In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 902-03 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
110. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847,850-51 (9th Cir. 1982).
111. See id. at 851-52. Other courts have criticized this standard as unduly
stringent and inconsistent with the language of the Rule. See, e.g., In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 726 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (preferring a
standard of substantial probability that, if damages were awarded, early liti-
gants would exhaust the defendants' assets), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Court
found it premature to decide the appropriate standard, because the class certifi-
cation in that case could not stand under either formulation, 527 U.S. 815, 848-
49 n.26 (1999).
112. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 852. Although one can cite as counter-
examples to this proposition the Supreme Court cases articulating limits on the
imposition of punitive damages, the Ninth Circuit's statement in Dalkon Shield
is, to some degree, circumstantially supported by the many decisions that have
declined to strike punitive damages awards on the ground that they constituted
repetitive punishment for the same conduct. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d
1371, 1386-87 (3d Cir.) (en bane), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.) (finding defen-
dant's evidence to fall far short of demonstrating a due process violation in the
entry of punitive damages awards against it, and listing several cases, decided
by both state and federal courts, that declined to strike punitive damages
awards on the ground that they constituted repetitive punishment, after stating
that the majority of courts to have addressed the issue have declined to strike
punitive damages awards on that ground), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn, 510 U.S. 1031 (1993); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977) (not precluding successive punitive dam-
ages awards for the same course of conduct, but permitting consideration of
prior such awards in assessing punitive damages); see generally Andrea G.
Nadel, Annotation, Propriety ofAwarding Punitive Damages to Separate Plain-
tiffs Bringing Successive Actions Arising out of Common Incident or Circum-
stances Against Common Defendant or Defendants ("One Bite" or "First Comer"
Doctrine), 11 A.L.R. 4th 1261, 1262 (1982 & Supp. 2000) (noting frequent judi-
cial conclusion that previous or potential awards of punitive damages for the
same conduct do not preclude a plaintiff from recovering such damages).
113. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 857.
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Absent any evidentiary record or effort on behalf of the plain-
tiff class to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) requirements, it is dif-
ficult to believe that the Dalkon Shield court could squarely
have been confronted with the question of how to delineate the
requirements that were not tested by the facts or the litigants'
presentations.114
Days earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had
vacated a class certification order that, in part, had certified a puni-
tive damages class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) (as to both liability for
and amount of punitive damages) in In re Federal Skywalk Cases. 1l5
In that case, uncertainty under Missouri law as to whether plaintiffs
could recover multiple punitive damages awards based upon a single
wrongful act of the defendant was one, but only one, of the grounds
upon which the district court had so certified the class. ll6 Rather
than review the certification in and of itself, the appeals court fo-
cused upon the district court's express prohibition of class member
settlements of their punitive damages claims and its order enjoining
plaintiffs from pursuing pending state court actions concerning li-
ability and the amount of punitive damages they could recover. ll7
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that this injunction violated the
Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA,,)llB was the basis of its vacation of the
class certification order. For present purposes, it is important that,
in the course of its reasoning to the conclusion that the injunction in
support of class certification had violated the AlA, the court rejected
the analogy to a limited fund. 1l9 The court took the position that,
where a "class has an uncertain claim for punitive damages against
defendants who have not conceded liability[,] ... [the] claim does not
qualify as a limited fund," declaring that, "the premise that the pos-
sibility of defendants being required to pay only one punitive dam-
age award is comparable to the limited fund concept underlying fed-
eral interpleader ... is erroneous.,,120
In In re School Asbestos Litigation,121 the district court had certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) a mandatory, nationwide, class of school
districts seeking punitive damages from asbestos manufacturers
and distributors. The trial court sought thereby to avoid "overkill"
and create parity of treatment for the plaintiffs, although it permit-
ted plaintiffs who opted out of the (b)(3) class for compensatory
114. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 9, at 2015.
115. 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S.
988 (1982).
116. Id. at 1179.
117. Id. at 1180.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). For further discussion of the AIA, see infra
notes 204, 216-51 and accompanying text.
119. In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
120. Id.
121. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
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damages to settle their punitive damages claims against the defen-
dants.122 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the
mandatory class certification.123 It assumed, without deciding, that
the various arguments favoring prevention of repetitive punitive
damages awards "might provide a threshold justification for the ex-
ercise of discretion in certifying a nationwide (mandatory) Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class for punitive damages.,,124 Although holding open
the possibility of such classes in other circumstances,125 the court ul-
timately held that "neither the record nor the ... findings" made in
this case were "adequate to support the procedure" here.126 The lack
of fact findings as to the potential amount of punitive damages and,
most importantly, the under-inclusiveness of the plaintiff class,
doomed the certification because the court could neither protect the
defendants nor equitably allocate the award among plaintiffs. The
class did not include all property damage claimants or any personal
injury claimants, and the court believed that all of those persons
would be subject to any limit placed on the total punitive damages
liability of the asbestos defendants.127 The court concluded that "a
mandatory class predicated on a potential legal limit to punitive
damages would logically include all litigants who seek such
awards,,,128 but the court could not see how the class could be ex-
panded to encompass all the necessary parties.129 The court also was
concerned that, under the circumstances, those included in the
mandatory class would actually be disadvantaged by the delay en-
tailed in being involved in such a suit, rather than being able to pro-
ceed individually.13o Finally, the court worried that the use oflim-
ited generosity theory might violate the parties' substantive rights,
in violation of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. l3l It declared, "if we can-
not make a reasonable prediction that state courts will uniformly
accept the limited generosity theory, a class may not be certified
122. Id. at 999, 1003.
123. Id. at 1011.
124. Id. at 1005.
125. Id. at 1008.
126. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1005-07 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 852 (1986).
127. See id. at 1005-06.
128. Id. at 1006.
129. See id. The court commented that under-inclusiveness of the class
might not always and necessarily be fatal, but that it was an insurmountable
obstacle in this case. See id. at 1007.
130. See id. at 1006-07.
131. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts sitting in diversity to apply
substantive state law, for reasons of policy, statutory interpretation, and consti-
tutionality). The School Asbestos court was concerned that the trial court had
not fully taken into account the potentially differing legal requirements for and
limits upon punitive damages of the fifty states from which class members
came. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.s. 852 (1986).
2001] LIMITED GENEROSITY CLASSES 1071
with that concept as its underlying justification.,,132 For all of these
reasons, the court vacated the (b)(I)(B) certification.133
One immediate comment I would make about the School Asbes-
tos case is that, for reasons discussed further below,134 the court was
correct to be concerned about the use of a limited generosity basis
for a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class certification when the states whose puni-
tive damages laws properly apply vary in the limitations, if any,
that they impose on the recovery of punitive damages. However, I
think that the court was wrong to be concerned about whether the
pertinent states uniformly accepted (or were likely soon to accept)
limited generosity theory per se, for that theory is merely an inter-
pretation of a procedural rule (Rule 23(b)(I)(B) and state law ana-
logues); it is not substantive law that the federal courts would be
obliged to follow in cases within diversity subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
The latest word from the Supreme Court on Rule 23(b)(I)(B)
class certifications came in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.135 In Ortiz, the
Court found that the requirements of Rule 23 were not satisfied, and
overturned a global agreement settling the personal injury claims of
a large class of persons who had sued Fibreboard for asbestos expo-
sure.
13B Pursuant to an agreement negotiated by plaintiffs' attorneys
with defendants (Fibreboard and certain insurance companies), a
group of named plaintiffs had filed an action in federal district court
seeking certification of a mandatory settlement class comprised of
certain persons with personal injury claims attributed to asbestos
exposure.137 The parties had presented the court with a Global Set-
tlement Agreement.13B After notice to potential class members and
intervention by objectors, the court had held a fairness hearing, af-
ter which it certified the groposed class under Rule 23(b)(I)(B) and
approved the settlement. 39 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.140 Its deci-
sion was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of
132. Sch. Asbestos, 789 F.2d at 1007.
133. See id. at 1007-08. In light of its conclusions, the court did not reach
other issues that had been argued: (1) whether a mandatory class would be in-
consistent with the due process considerations discussed in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), and (2) whether certification of such a class
would violate the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). Id. The court
did not indicate whether the issues it had in mind related to matters of personal
jurisdiction or to choice oflaw, both of which were involved in Shutts. Id.
134. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
135. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
136. Id. at 821.
137. Id. at 825-26.
138. Id. at 824-25. The Global Settlement provided for $1.525 billion to be
contributed by Fibreboard's insurers, and for Fibreboard to contribute $10 mil-
lion, all but $500,000 of which would come from other insurance proceeds. The
money was to be paid to personal injury claimants who alleged harm from Fi-
breboard's asbestos products. Id.
139. Id. at 827-28.
140. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 828 (1999).
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Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor. 141 On remand, the Fifth Circuit
again affirmed.142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.
The Supreme Court examined the varieties of suits traditionally
encompassed by Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and discerned three characteristics
that typify "limited fund" class actions and whose presence justifies
(b)(1)(B) certification. The three characteristics are:
(1) a fund with a definitely ascertained limit which, at its
maximum, is demonstrated to be exceeded by aggregate liq-
uidated claims, set at their maxima;
(2) all of which (fund) is to be distributed to those with liqui-
dated claims that are based on a common theory of liability;
and
(3) all claimants sharing a common theory of recovery to be
treated equitably among themselves, typically (historically)
by a pro rata distribution ofthe fund. 143
The Court concluded that these characteristics are presump-
tively necessary for limited fund (b)(l)(B) certification, that courts
should presume that the drafters intended courts to "stay close to
the historical model,,,144 and that a proponent of any departure from
these norms would have the burden of justifying that departure.145
This conservative approach appeared to be tied to the Court's per-
ception that the Advisory Committee did not contemplate that
(b)(l)(B) would be used for unliquidated tort claims.146
Having laid down these precepts, the Court concluded that the
record in Ortiz did not support the essential premises of mandatory
limited fund actions. It failed to demonstrate that the fund was lim-
ited, except by the agreement of the parties.147 Moreover, both ex-
clusions from the class and the allocations of assets were at odds
with the concept of limited fund treatment and with the structural
protections of Rule 23(a) that the Court had explained in Amchem.148
Specifically, the lower courts erred in uncritically adopting fig-
ures agreed upon by the parties in defining the limits of the fund
and demonstrating its inadequacy.149 Without adequate showings of
both the aggregate claims and the upper limit of the fund, no show-
ing of the insufficiency of the latter was possible. Parties wishing to
obtain and maintain approval of a limited fund class action suit for
141. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
142. Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668, 669-70 (1998).
143. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838-39.
144. Id. at 842.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 843-44 n.20.
147. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 848.
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money damages must present evidence from which the district court
can ascertain both the limit ofthe fund and its insufficiency, and the
district court must make findings of fact concerning both of these
elements, following a proceeding in which the evidence put on by the
parties is subject to challenge by opponents (persons who object to a
proposed settlement and perhaps to the certification itself).150
The Court next found that the certification of the Ortiz class fell
short of the requirement that equity would be done in the distribu-
tion of the limited fund. It fell short both because the certified class
was under-inclusive and because the lower courts had failed to
mandate procedures to resolve how differently situated claimants
could be treated fairly. With respect to the first, the Court stated
emphatically that,
there can be no question that such a mandatory settlement
class will not qualifY when in the very negotiations aimed at a
class settlement, class counsel agree to exclude what could
turn out to be as much as a third of the claimants that nego-
tiators thought might eventually be involved, a substantial
number ofwhom class counsel represent. l5l
In other words, because the very purpose of a limited fund class
action of this type is to equitably divide a limited fund among claim-
ants suing on a common legal theory, a limited fund class action
could not properly be certified if a substantial number of those who
"ought" to be within the class action were excluded from it. The
Court left unresolved ''how far a natural class may be depleted by
prior dispositions of claims and still qualifY as a mandatory limited
fund class.,,152 The Court added that, even if there were parity be-
tween the benefits received by class members with present claims
and those received by those left out of the class, the certification
would have to fall if, as here, the district court failed to assure that
subclasses with conflicting interests were independently repre-
sented.153
The second major problem with the certification that the Court
analyzed under the rubric of the equity required in limited fund
class actions was (as just noted) that the court and the parties had
failed to assure that subclasses with conflicting interests were inde-
pendently represented. Such "structural protection" is essential
and, despite Amchem having made clear that holders of present
claims and holders of future claims have diverging interests that re-
quire they be separated into subclasses and separately represented,
that protection had not been afforded here.154 Moreover, as Amchem
150. [d. at 848-49.
151. [d. at 854.
152. [d.
153. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 855 (1999).
154. [d. at 856-57.
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had indicated, the interest of all class members in securing con-
tested insurance funds for the payment of claims, or a conclusion
that the overall settlement was fair, did not eliminate the need for
subclasses.155 Rule 23(a)'s and (b)'s requirements could not be "swal-
lowed" or obviated by a determination that a settlement was fair. 156
Finally, the Court noted that the fund provided here was
smaller than the value of the assets understood by the Court of Ap-
peals to be available for payment of the mandatory class members'
claims, and that this was a marked departure from limited fund
precedents.157 The Court found no need to decide whether this fea-
ture alone would be fatal to the Global Settlement Agreement, but it
spoke in strong language to make clear that such an arrangement
seems irreconcilable with the justification of necessity in deny-
ing any opportunity for withdrawal of class members whose
jury trial rights will be compromised, whose damages will be
capped, and whose payments will be delayed. With Fibreboard
retaining nearly all its net worth, it hardly appears that such a
regime is the best that can be provided for class members.158
I have discussed Ortiz as extensively as I have in order to ex-
tract as many lessons as possible from it in evaluating the viability
of mandatory limited generosity classes. Before turning to such an
independent evaluation, I briefly note what lower courts considering
limited fund or limited generosity class certification have made of
Ortiz, insofar as relevant here. Some have noted that, while the
Court ostensibly left open whether (b)(1)(B) ever may be used to ag-
gregate individual tort claims,159 the Court's advocacy of strict ad-
herence to the traditional model may sound "the death knell for
mass tort suit" certifications under this portion of the Rule.160 Inso-
far as claims for punitive damages arising out of mass torts are, for
present purposes, indistinguishable from unliquidated claims for
compensatory damages for the underlying torts, their certification
under (b)(l)(B) would be equally threatened. However, punitive
damages claims may be distinguished by the limitations placed upon
153. Id. at 857-58.
156. Id. at 858-59.
157. Id. at 859.
158. Id. at 860.
159. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 844, 864 (1999).
160. Doe v. Karadzic, 192 F.R.D. 133, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Wish v.
Interneuron Pharms., Inc. (In re: Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 98-20594,
1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14881 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999) (tracking the reasoning of
Ortiz in vacating a conditional class certification and a stay of all state and fed-
eral court proceedings against defendant). Where the court could not determine
the true scope of the "fund" or defendant's potential liability and could not as-
certain whether the class was receiving the best possible deal, the proposed re-
tention by the class of a creditor's interest in defendant's ongoing business was
"alien to the nature of a limited fund under Rule 23," id. at *28, and various cir-
cumstances made equitable distribution ofthe fund difficult.
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them by state and federal constitutional law. Some mandatory pu-
nitive damages classes have been maintained in the wake of Ortiz. 161
C. The Viability ofLimited Generosity Theory as a Predicate for
(b)(l)(B) Certification
Neither Ortiz, nor Amchem, nor any other Supreme Court deci-
sion disallowed, or even addressed, mandatory punitive damages
classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Let us first consider how
well limited generosity classes might satisfY the three characteris-
tics of "limited fund" class actions that typify, and whose presence
suffices to justifY, (b)(1)(B) limited fund certification, according to
Ortiz.
1. A Fund with a Definitely Ascertained Limit which, at its
Maximum, is Exceeded by Aggregate Liquidated Punitive
D Cl ' 162amages a£ms
In considering the prove-ability of a fund with a definitely as-
certained limit that, at its maximum, is demonstrated to be ex-
ceeded by aggregate liquidated claims set at their maxima, several
issues arise. The first is the existence of a definitely ascertainable
and ascertained limit.
a. State Law/Multiple Law Complications
If, under applicable choice of law principles constitutionally ap-
plied, different state punitive damages laws, including caps in some
instances, would have to govern the claims of sub-groups of class
members, it is not entirely clear (to me) how a court would combine
or coordinate those differing caps, and perhaps absences thereof, to
come up with a definitely ascertained limit.16 Perhaps it would not
161. See, e.g., Baker v. Exxon Corp., 239 F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (in a
case involving a mandatory punitive damages claim, upholding defendants'
ability to recover on punitive damage claims assigned to them by plaintiffs in
partial settlement of the action, despite defendant having provided the punitive
damages fund).
162. Consistent with the Court's finding this to be a core characteristic of
limited fund class actions traditionally encompassed by Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the
Court also admonished that mandatory class treatment is justified only when
there is a fund with a definitely ascertained limit, all of which would be distrib-
uted by an equitable, pro rata distribution, to satisfy those with liquidated
claims (based on a common theory ofliability). Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841.
163. While in many contexts the variation in states' laws is not great, and
class plaintiffs' claims can be gathered into a manageable number of groups
(avoiding unmanageability or predominance of individual, over common, ques-
tions, for example) (see, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litiga-
tion, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 584 (1996», in the context under discussion it is
less clear whether a reduction of the applicable limits on punitive damages from
50 to 4, for example, would solve the problem of how the remaining limits would
be combined or coordinated. Similarly, although state-by-state class actions or
sub-classes have been proposed as a solution to the certification problems posed
by application of various states' laws, see, e.g., Erichson, supra note 93, it re-
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be too difficult: for example, if, in state A, the applicable limit on
punitive damages for harm done there was X dollars, and, in state
B, the limit on punitive damages was twice the compensatory dam-
ages suffered by injured parties in or from that state, one could add
all the limits together to derive an aggregate limit. This solution
would entail having the court or the jury164 make all the necessary
determinations: the punitive damages awarded for conduct doing
harm in state A, the compensatory damages suffered by those in or
from state B, etc. The court would have to guard against overlap (so
that damages to Plaintiff 1 "from" state B but injured in state A
were not double-counted), however, and, if maximum punitive dam-
ages were to be determined before (some) compensatory damages
were assessed, it is hard to see how the court could determine (other
than by estimation, extrapolation, or the like) punitive damages that
are a multiple of compensatory damages, in order to add them into
th t · 165e equa Ion.
Thus, if a forum state's choice of law principles led to the selec-
tion of a single state's punitive damages law to govern the punitive
damages to be awarded for a mass tort course of conduct, or if Con-
gress legislated the application of such a single body of law, and if
that single selection were constitutional/66 one could have a "fund"
with a definitely ascertained limit. One could continue the analysis
ofwhether a limitation upon punitive damages contained within the
governing law would create a situation in which mandatory class
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) would be appropriate. However,
if no such single body of punitive damages law will govern the puni-
mains unclear how courts would combine or coordinate the limits on punitive
damages that the applicable laws would dictate.
164. I "fudge" here on who the deciding person or entity would be; one nor-
mally would not have a jury making findings as a predicate to whether a par-
ticular sort of class ought to be certified.
165. As indicated by the earlier discussion of Supreme Court cases, fact-
finders who are imposing punitive damages are permitted to consider potential
harm that a defendant's conduct would have caused had defendant's wrongful
plans succeeded, and possible harms that might have resulted if similar future
behavior were not deterred. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 460 (1993). For a discussion of TXO, see supra notes 28-45 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, as a matter of substantive due process, punitive damages do
not have to be closely tied to compensatory damage awards. The text of this Ar-
ticle is focusing at this point on state law dictates concerning the calculation
and limits upon punitive damages.
166. Congress might be able to reach this end either by legislating a sub-
stantive body of punitive damages law to apply in specified circumstances in-
volving mass torts, or by legislating a choice of law rule for such cases. See AM.
LAw INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
310 (1994) (asserting that three constitutional sources support the enactment of
federal statutory choice of law rules for complex litigation: The Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. N, § 1; and the Judicial Power Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, as imple-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; and explor-
ing each of these).
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tive damages to be awarded for a mass tort course of conduct, man-
datory class certification under Rule 23(b)(I)(B) might be "dead in
the water" "right off the bat" (to mix metaphors), unless a court
could combine or coordinate the differing caps, so as to arrive at a
"fund" with a definitely ascertained limit.
The Possibility of a Single Substantive Law Governing Punitive
Damages Claims in Multi-State Mass Tort Litigation
In mass tort cases touching only one state, a single substantive
law governing punitive damages certainly could apply. It also
seemed possible that, in some multi-state mass tort cases, a court
constitutionally could select a single substantive law to govern all of
the punitive damages claims. For example, in Simon v. Philip Mor-
ris/67 alleging, inter alia, a conspiracy among tobacco companies to
dispute and deflect attention from evidence of smoking's harmful ef-
fects, Judge Jack Weinstein issued a memorandum opinion holding
preliminarily that New York law constitutionally could be applied to
all the liability claims (aside from the damages issues), notwith-
standing plaintiffs' domiciles around the country and allegations of
nationwide harm. He also opined that the number of individual
compensatory claims tried in the Eastern District of New York
might provide a basis to project total probable compensatory dam-
ages nationwide, adequate to allow a jury in his court to fix total al-
lowable punitive damages for the nation in the non-opt-out punitive
damages class certified in the companion case known asSimon II. 168
Perhaps the reasons supporting application of New York law to the
elements of liability (should it hold up on appeal) also would suffice
to validate the application of New York law to all punitive damages
claims in the case. 169
Earlier, in In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield"
IUD Products Liability Litigation,170 the district court had failed to
find any true conflict between the general policies underlying the
various state standards for awarding punitive damages, and had
concluded that, in the absence of such a true conflict or compelling
interests of other states in having their law applied, either Califor-
167. 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
168. Simon II refers to In re Simon II Litigation, No. 00 CV 5332, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12611 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). See Simon v. Philip Morris, No. 99
CV 1988, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16713, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov; 16, 2000). Judge
Weinstein contemplated that, as ultimately amended, Simon II "would then
cover all private claims for injury as a result of Tobacco's activities, with some
exceptions." Id.
169. The court stated that choice of law considerations as to punitive dam-
ages would be addressed in a separate opinion. See Simon, No. 99 CV 1988,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16713, at *18-19. But see infra notes 163-69 and accom-
panying text.
170. 526 F. Supp. 887, 915-17 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
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nia law or a compromise standard should be applied. l7l However,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs' argument that punitive
damages standards vary among the states, and "can range from
gross negligence to reckless disregard to various levels of willfulness
and wantonness.,,172 Based in part on this variance, the court held it
to have been error to certifY a nationwide class of punitive damages
claimants.
There is now even further reason to fear that no single state's
punitive damages law could constitutionally be applied to a course of
conduct causing nationwide or even just multi-state harm. The Su-
preme Court's decision in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore173 in-
dicated clearly that the economic penalties that a state inflicts, in-
cluding punitive damages, have to be supported by the state's
interest in protecting its own consumers and economy, and may not
be used to protect the consumers or economies of other states.174
That reasoning seems to imply that a single state's punitive dam-
ages law cannot be the basis for a punitive damages award that re-
flects a defendant's conduct, or the harm caused or threatened by a
defendant's conduct, nationwide or even in multiple states. The
Court's reasoning, with its reliance on state sovereignty and comity,
individual states' interests and policies, and protection of a state's
own consumers and economy, but nothing more,175 seems almost to
guarantee that the punitive damages laws of multiple states must
be invoked to provide the basis for punitive damages that arise from
multi-state or national harm. Although others have viewed Gore as
facilitating class-wide assessment of punitive damages because it
171. See also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25,
1979, 644 F.2d 633, 637 n.5 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding, in a multi-district liti-
gation, after surveying the choice of law doctrines of many states, that all of
them would apply Illinois law to determine plaintiffs' right to recover prejudg-
ment interest); AM. LAw INST., supra note 166, at 315-16 (proposing that, where
otherwise applicable laws conflict in transferred cases, transferee judge choose
a single law to control particular issues that cut across cases); id. § 6.01 (provid-
ing guidelines for mass torts); id. § 6.06 (proposing guidelines for punitive dam-
ages).
172. Dalhon Shield, 693 F.2d at 850. At least one commentator has argued
that federal courts must be free to formulate and apply a uniform standard of
punitive damages liability to entire plaintiff classes. See Tobin, supra note 95,
at 480-87. Tobin's argument in support of this plea seems flawed to me, but it
is clear why he would like such a uniform standard to apply. In support of his
argument, Tobin contends that the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manu-
facturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), requiring federal courts in diversity cases to
apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they are sitting, should be
held inapplicable; that federal courts should characterize the punitive damage
standard that they use as procedural(!)-perhaps he confuses the possibility
that choice-of-Iaw could be procedural with the standard for punitive damages
being procedural; and that the law of the defendant's principal place of business
should dictate the standard of punitive damages liability. Id.
173. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
174. See id. at 568-74.
175. See id. at 572-73.
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implies that "the temporal and geographic scope of a defendant's
conduct properly before a court for assessment of punitive damages
must be commensurate with the scope of the plaintiff group actually
in court,,,176 the Court's reasoning, as it bears upon choice of law,
seems to be more an obstacle than a boon to multi-state or national
class actions. So, while a jury in a nationwide class action could
consider defendant's conduct, wherever in the nation it occurred, as
well as the nationwide consequences of that conduct, the potential
application of multiple bodies of punitive damages law remains
problematic.
b. Limitations Imposed by Due Process
Absent a suitable limit predicated on state law, one or more of
the parties and the court could seek a definitely ascertainable limit
deriving from federal due process principles. Do the cases provide
that? They demand certain procedural protections, which the class
court can be expected to afford. The substantive due process re-
quirements that the Court has articulated look to reasonableness in
light of such factors as punitive damages' nature and purpose, the
character and degree of the defendant's wrongs, the harm defendant
did and might have caused and the harm that might result if similar
future behavior were not deterred, the relationship to compensatory
damages, the defendant's wealth, and the culpability of defendant's
state of mind. Moreover, "while courts have thus far declined to
construe the Due Process Clause as a per se prohibition against
multiple punitive awards for the same conduct, they have uniformly
acknowledged [and some state legislatures have mandated]177 that
earlier punitive awards must be considered in mitigation of later
ones.,,178 Are the requirements of substantive due process sufficient
to create a fund with a definitely ascertainable maximum? The fac-
tors that go into the substantive due process analysis seem to allow
considerable latitude. Still, the idea is that due process does impose
a limit, a maximum, beyond which punitive damages for a particular
act or course of conduct would be unconstitutional. That very con-
cept posits that courts can arrive at a definite, ascertainable limit on
punitive damages, which is one of the necessary predicates for a lim-
ited generosity class.
c. Liquidation ofAggregate Punitive Damages Claims
176. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 9, at 2019-20.
177. See Appendix.
178. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 9, at 2019 (footnotes omitted) (citing such
cases as Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386-87 (3d Cir. 1993) (en bane), modi-
fied, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. v. Dunn, 510 U.S. 1031 (1993) (for a discussion ofDunn v. HOVIC, see su-
pra note 93); and Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1257 & n.14 (9th Cir.
1993) (indicating that other civil awards against the defendant, for the same
conduct, should be taken into account, in mitigation».
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If the case law does allow the courts to determine a definitely
ascertained limit on punitive damages derived from due process or
from state law, the next question would be whether parties could
demonstrate that that fund is exceeded by the plaintiffs' aggregate
liquidated claims, set at their maximum. In other words, could the
parties demonstrate that the maximum amount of punitive damages
that governing state law or due process would permit to be awarded
is exceeded by plaintiffs' aggregate "liquidated" claims for pup.itive
damages?
The claims involved in the antecedents to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) ap-
parently all were liquidated, a characteristic upon which the Ortiz
Court placed some emphasis.179 By contrast, the punitive damages
claims that we are considering normally would be unliquidated at
the time of class certification. This should give pause to those who
would like to feel certain that "limited generosity" situations will be-
come regular occasions for class certification under Rule 23(b)(l)(B).
But should this lack of immediate liquidation be fatal?
It seems to me that there are significant problems here. Ordi-
narily, it would be impracticable to stay class-wide pursuit of puni-
tive damages until all pertinent mass tort claims had been liqui-
dated by adjudication or settlement, for that might take many years,
even decades, in the context of hundreds, thousands, even millions
of compensatory damages claims, particularly if those could not be
resolved on a class-wide basis180 or if assertion of some of the claims
had to await the manifestation of injury after a long latency period.
If a mandatory punitive damages class action could proceed in ad-
vance of the determination of (some) class members' claims for com-
pensatory damages-and decide, inter alia, liability for punitive
damages-it would be possible to determine, to "liquidate," each
class member's claim for punitive damages, concurrently with the
determination of his or her compensatory damages, by application of
a predetermined formula that would, for example, make punitive
179. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 835-37 (1999) (citing Dick-
inson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.) (involving class plaintiffs who had
fully ascertained damages that allowed equitable pro rata distribution), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952»; Guffanti v. Nat'l Surety Co., 90 N.E. 174, 176
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1909) (allowing plaintiff class to seek restitution of lost deposits
on equitable, pro rata basis, from surety bond funds); Ross v. Crary, 1 Paige Ch.
416, 417-18 (N.Y. Ch. 1829) (concluding that consolidation of similarly situated
legatees' claims against limited estate assets allowed equitable distribution of
funds); cf City & County of San Francisco v. Market St. RR Co., 213 P.2d 780
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (allowing plaintiff class to seek injunction to prevent defen-
dant with limited assets from providing cash dividends to shareholders, because
all plaintiffs had "common and general" interest in potential tort judgments
that would benefit any member of the class».
180. Certification of classes seeking to. assert mass tort compensatory dam-
age claims often is denied upon judicial findings oflack of typical claims, lack of
adequate representative parties, an absence of predominating common ques-
tions, or upon the conclusion that the class action device is not a superior ap-
proach to resolving the claims. See supra note 4.
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damages a multiple of the compensatory damages award. lsl On that
basis, or perhaps on the basis of an educated extrapolation from past
compensatory damages awards to persons in the punitive damages
class, at some point in time a court could judge whether aggregate
punitive damages recoverable by the class would exceed the punitive
damages "fund," at its maximum. Moreover, insofar as punitive
damages do not need to be a function of, or bear a particular rela-
tionship to, compensatory damages, punitive damages might be liq-
uidated without awaiting the determination of compensatory dam-
ages. This is a stretch from past law but one which may be worth
making, in view of all the benefits of mandatory punitive damages
classes, ifthere are no other insurmountable hurdles.
It should be noted parenthetically that, if there is no definitely
ascertained limit on punitive damages, or if such a limit is not ex-
ceeded by aggregate liquidated punitive damages claims, then there
is no need for a mandatory class, and none should be certified.
2. All of the Fund to be Distributed to Those with (Liquidated)
Claims that are Based on a Common Theory ofLiability
a. Common Theory
The classic characteristic that the fund would be distributed to
satisfy the claims ofthose suing on a common theory ofliability also
might pose an obstacle to (b)(l)(B) certification in an era when theo-
ries of liability have multiplied and similarly-situated persons may
sue on a variety of differing legal theories. Plaintiffs' lawyers should
be able to deal with this requirement, however, by having the class
seek punitive damages on one or more common theories of liability,
rather than having different class members assert different theories.
If courts were narrowly to interpret "common theory of liability" to
imply that only persons suing under a single state's tort law could
be basing their claims on a common theory of liability, that would
cause difficulty; but the better view would be that all who are as-
serting gross negligence (or some other legal theory) should be
viewed as basing their claims on a common theory of liability,
notwithstanding that the laws of different states would apply to the
claims.
b. Under-inclusiveness
181. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 299-300 (5th
Cir. 1998) (noting that the trial court planned, in phase I of the trial, to decide
whether a punitive damages multiplier should be imposed before determining
compensatory damages for individual class members); Jenkins v. Raymark In-
dus., 782 F.2d 468, 471-75 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding a multi-phase trial struc-
ture in which the first phase was to include, inter alia, the fixing of a punitive
damages multiplier, to be applied later to future compensatory damages ver-
dicts).
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More fundamental to the idea that all of the fund must be dis-
tributed to a similarly-situated group of claimants is the concern
that inequitable results not be permitted to result from under-
inclusiveness of the class. Implicit in the notion that all claimants
are to be treated equitably among themselves is the requirement
that all of the claimants who "should" be included within the class
are included. When mandatory (b)(1) class certification is sought,
the court has to satisfY itself that the proposed class is sufficiently
inclusive to fulfill the purposes of the certification. Otherwise, peo-
ple outside the class may be either unduly advantaged or unduly
disadvantaged as compared with what distributive justice and equi-
table allocation would provide, and the defendant also will lose the
protections that a mandatory class is intended to afford. In some
mass tort cases it is not difficult to describe the persons who belong
in the mandatory class. It should not be difficult, for example, in
mass accident cases where a single incident (a fire, an airplane
crash) injures a describable and ascertainable group of individuals.
In other mass tort cases, where the underlying misconduct and inju-
ries occur over a long period of time and over a large geographic
area, where causation is controverted and the alleged injuries are
varied, it may be difficult to decide how the class should be defined,
and to include everyone whom the court concludes should be in-
cluded. This was one of the problems in the School Asbestos case,
discussed above.182 That difficulties would arise in some cases is not,
of course, a reason to disapprove mandatory punitive damages
classes across the board, but it does point out that parties and courts
may not be able to make such classes work as often as they might
like.
c. Defining the Course-of-Conduct
A similar, and indeed overlapping and contributory, problem
arises from the sometimes-difficult task of determining what con-
duct falls within the course of conduct for which a particular class
can seek and recover punitive damages. If a defendant has manu-
factured and distributed cigarettes, asbestos, or some drug for dec-
ades, should all who were damaged by its product and its tortious
conduct be included in one punitive damages c~ass? Perhaps defen-
dant's conduct became more culpable at a certain point than it had
been before, and those plaintiffs who were injured after that time
"should" get greater punitive damages than those who were injured
earlier. Those problems seem manageable through sub-classes.
Putting them aside, defendants will want the court to utilize as en-
compassing a course of conduct and corresponding class as possible
so that its liability for punitive damages, as determined in the class
action, will protect it from the maximum number of"other" potential
claims for punitive damages.
182. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
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Plaintiffs will not necessarily share the interest in a maximally-
encompassing class, although plaintiffs' attorneys might maximize
their earnings by maximizing the size of the punitive damages class.
Plaintiffs' interest is in maximizing, and in equitable distribution of,
the punitive damages pot that is held to be available for the victims
of whatever particular course of conduct the action focuses upon.
Potential plaintiffs left outside the class definition would be left with
the burden of bringing their own (class or individual) litigation, with
the attendant costs and litigation risks.183 So long as there is not an
insufficient assets problem, they should not (otherwise) be adversely
affected by being left outside the borders of the first mandatory pu-
nitive damages class. What is important is that it be clear what
conduct the defendant already has been punished for, and who was
included, and who excluded, from prior mandatory punitive dam-
ages classes. The lack of clarity in one or both of these regards has
been one of the factors in courts' reluctance to limit multiple puni-
t · d d 184lve amages awar s.
3. All Claimants Sharing a Common Theory ofRecovery to be
Treated Equitably Among Themselves, Typically (Historically)
by a Pro Rata Distribution ofthe Fund
Historically and traditionally in limited fund cases, all claim-
ants were to be treated equitably among themselves.185 This typi-
cally translated into "pro rata" distribution of the fund. Proportion-
ate distribution of a punitive damages award could be effected by
the use of a predetermined ratio of punitive to compensatory dam-
183. They might make some headway via collateral estoppel insofar as is-
sues in their case are identical to issues that were litigated and necessarily de-
cided against the defendant in the first mandatory punitive damages class ac-
tion. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (indicating the
circumstances under which a nonparty can assert collateral estoppel against
the entity that was a defendant in a prior action, and looking to matters includ-
ing: (1) whether the nonparty could have joined the prior litigation; (2) whether
the subsequent litigation was foreseeable so that the defendant had every in-
centive vigorously to defend the first action; (3) whether the judgment being re-
lied upon is consistent with prior judgments against the defendant; and (4)
whether there are procedural opportunities available to the defendant in the
subsequent action that did not exist in the earlier suit, and that might result in
a different outcome).
184. See, e.g., Simpson v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 280-81 (2d
Cir.) (positing that, if the factfinder making the first award understood its task
to be to award a sum appropriate to punish a tortfeasor for the full extent of its
wrongful conduct, due process might indicate that a subsequent award be
stricken; however, the issue would be posed only when the defendant could
demonstrate that the original factfinder had a complete record of the full extent
of the wrongdoing, and was instructed to make an award appropriate to punish
the totality of the misconduct), cert. dismissed, 497 U.S. 1057 (1990); see also
supra notes 90, 112.
185. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 839 (1999).
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ages.186 A problem could arise if there were a conflict between this
principle and the dictates of state law, applicable to various class
members, commanding that particular class members receive either
more or less than their pro rata share.187 However, if the governing
principle is equitable distribution, as opposed to pro rata distribu-
tion, then an allocation of punitive damages that follows the dictates
of applicable bodies of state law could satisfy the requirement of eq-
uitable distribution.
Another problem, arising at a pragmatic level, could be courts'
inability to determine class members' shares. Even if the court had
"liquidated" the aggregate punitive damages claims (and determined
that they exceeded the punitive damages "fund" at its maximum,
since the aggregate punitive damages claims would exceed the mon-
ies legally available to pay them), each claimant would have to re-
ceive less than his theoretical "entitlement." How much less could
only be estimated until each member's theoretical share had been
determined, based, for example, upon a predetermined ratio of puni-
tive to compensatory damages. Courts would therefore probably
have to make conservative tentative distributions, maintaining a re-
serve for the payment of class members whose theoretical entitle-
ment was determined later and for distribution of any excess to all
class members, when all claims had been established.188
4. Other Arguments in Favor of Limited Generosity (b)(l)(BJ
Class Certifications
It would be possible to argue that the classic characteristics of
(b)(l)(B) classes that the Ortiz Court declared to be presumptively
necessary play that role only when certification is sought on the
grounds of an insufficient-assets type of limited fund, and would not
be an obstacle when certification is sought because of legally-
imposed limitations on liability. The Court acknowledged that "the
text of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is ... open to a more lenient limited fund
concept,,,189 and it left the door open to litigants who propose depar-
tures from the traditional norms to overcome the presumptive ne-
cessity of all the traditional qualities of a limited fund class.19o In
the "limited generosity" context, one (arguably) would have a fund
with a definitely ascertainable limit (assets of the defendant, capped
186. Id. at 839-41.
187. State law might, for example, cap a class member's punitive damages
award at less than her pro rata share.
188. Cf. Tobin, supra note 95, at 466 n.39 (proposing that the "size of each
punitive share will depend upon estimates as to the total number of potential
victims and the total compensatory recovery. In other words, the size of a puni-
tive share will be determined by multiplying the plaintiffs compensatory recov-
ery by the total punitive damage fund and dividing that sum by the total (esti-
mated) compensatory fund.").
189. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842.
190. See id.
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by law), creating a situation in which punitive damages judgments
for one or more claimants would create a risk of serious prejudice to
others similarly situated, and in which courts would seek equitably
to distribute all ofthe fund. Arguably, those elements should be suf-
ficient, ifone avoids conflict with the Rules Enabling Act and consti-
tutional concerns.
5. Other Concerns Fostering Conservative Handling of
(b)(l)(B) Certification Motions
Two of the factors that reinforced the Ortiz Court's inclination
toward conservative treatment of (b)(l)(B) certifications were the
desire to avoid potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Ace91 and
constitutional problems, such as failures to comply with the Seventh
Amendment.192
a. The Rules Enabling Act
The Rules Enabling Act prohibits rules that "abridge, enlarge or
modifY any substantive right.,,193 Since the legal limits imposed
upon the fund to be distributed would be founded in substantive
(usually state) law or in constitutional due process,194 perhaps the
case could be made that a procedure designed to respect those limits
could not violate the Rules Enabling Act. However, that argument
may finesse too much. Even if designed to respect and enforce state
law or even constitutionally-mandated limits on punitive damages,
it is possible that a class action mechanism compelling equitable
distribution of a legally-capped fund would abridge or modifY the
substantive rights that tort victims have enjoyed under substantive
state tort law. Such tort law may, for example, allow the award of
punitive damages to those persons who first successfully bring their
compensatory damages tort claims to judgment, and who are
awarded punitive damages under non-erroneous and constitutional
application of the state's standards regarding such damages-even
if those awards afford a disproportionate percentage of the total le-
gally permissible pot available for punitive damages. In other
words, under state substantive law, individual tort victims might
enjoy the right to recover punitive damages until the legal cap is hit,
with the greatest potential benefits being available to those who get
their cases to judgment early. However inequitable this system
might be, changing it could abridge or modifY substantive law in vio-
lation of the Rules Enabling Act. The question would be whether
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994) (providing the Supreme Court with power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure for cases in the district courts
and courts of appeals, and providing that such rules shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right).
192. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845-46.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
194. See supra notes 17-72 and accompanying text.
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such a change would have a merely incidental, and hence permissi-
ble, effect on substantive rights.195
b. Unconsented-to Compromise of Constitutional Rights
In addition, the constitutional issues that concerned the Ortiz
Court would remain at issue in at least some cases in which "limited
generosity" theory could be argued in support of (b)(1)(B) certifica-
tion of a punitive damages class. The Ortiz Court was concerned
that, in a mandatory class action raising legal issues, the Seventh
Amendment rights of class members who have future claims could
be compromised without their consent.196 The entitlement to puni-
tive damages upon the occasion of a defendant's tortious conduct is a
legal issue to which the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial197 at-
taches,198 in a class action, as well as in an individual suit.199 That
right presumably could be compromised by a settlement with the de-
fendants, entered into by the class representatives.20o The consent of
class members to that compromise might well be lacking in the case
of future claimants, who might even be unborn.201
Even the consent of absent class members with present claims
is subject to some doubt. The Supreme Court never has resolved
what due process requires in order for the absent members of man-
195. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (according to Edward H.
Cooper, Enabling Act Authority for Addressing Overlapping Class Actions,
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP., June 22, 2001, 458, 459, indicating that the Rules
Enabling Act "authorizes rules that affect substantial and important 'rights' so
long as the purpose is to serve the 'speedy, fair and exact determination of the
truth"'); id. (finding that, "[tlhe Enabling Act is not violated by the incidental
effect on substantive rights"). Moreover, some authority addresses the wisdom
of allowing class certification to affect the applicable choice of law. See Kramer,
supra note 163, at 549 (arguing that choice of law should not change to foster
administrative convenience and efficiency in aggregate litigation); Richard L.
Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23,80 CORNELL
L. REv. 858, 872-82 (1995) (exploring whether and when mass tort settlement
regimes properly can supplant state law that otherwise would apply).
196. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.s. 815, 846 (1999).
197. The Seventh Amendment provides,
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CaNST. amend. VII.
198. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 729
(1999) (stating that "a tort action for money damages is entitled to jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment"); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 427 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1970) (noting that common law right to jury
trial exists for all tort claims).
199. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-34, 538 (1970) (holding that
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial attaches based upon legal nature of the
claim to be tried, rather than upon the historic character of the action).
200. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 847.
201. See id. (speaking of the consent issue); id. at 856 (speaking of the un-
born).
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datory classes to be bound by a judgment.202 Rule 23 does not re-
quire that they be given notice of the action, nor an opportunity to
opt out (opt-out being the antithesis of the mandatory nature of cer-
tain class actions, including those certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
Failure to exercise the right to opt out can be the basis for an infer-
ence of consent to prosecution of a suit on a class member's behalf.203
Absent the right, the occasion not to opt out never arises, and the
failure-to-exercise basis for an inference of consent is lacking. Nor
may it be necessary, as a matter of due process, for Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
claimants to have minimum contacts with the forum state; for if one
limited the class to those who do, one would defeat the very pur-
poses and reasons for the class having been made mandatory. Cer-
tainly, adequate representation would be necessary to bind absent
class members, but it is not clear that such representation is also
sufficient to bind them. Thus, the Seventh Amendment issues and
the consent issues that concerned the Ortiz Court and inclined it to
interpret and apply Rule 23(b)(1)(B) conservatively also would lurk
in some, and perhaps all, cases in which the "limited generosity"
theory could be argued in support of (b)(1)(B) certification of a puni-
tive damages class.
***
Whether mandatory limited generosity classes are legally viable
under rules like Rule 23(b)(1)(B) thus remains very much in doubt.
If we can get over or around all the hurdles, the next question be-
comes the permissibility of anti-suit injunctions to prevent the un-
dermining of mandatory punitive damages classes by the prosecu-
tion of separate actions by class members who would seek to assert
punitive damages claims within the scope of the class action. The
Article now turns to that question.
IV. INJUNCTIONS OF PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ARE SOUGHT FOR THE SAME COURSE OF CONDUCT
When a mandatory punitive damages class is certified, that cer-
tification may be regarded implicitly as enjoining the filing and the
prosecution of pending cases in which punitive damages are sought
for the same course of conduct as has been put in controversy by the
certified mandatory class. Alternatively, the court certifYing that
mandatory class may want to enter an explicit injunction against
such litigation. When a federal court is the would-be enjoining
202. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,812 (1985) (holding that
in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, absent plaintiff class members can be bound con-
sistently with the requirements of due process only if the members receive no-
tice, an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to opt-out, and adequate repre-
sentation; explicitly reserving the question of what process is necessary to bind,
inter alia, absent members of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes).
203. See id. at 813.
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court, it is constrained by the Anti-Injunction Act.204 When a state
court is the would-be enjoiner, it is constrained by common law prin-
ciples predicated on notions of comity.
A. Federal Injunctions ofState Court Proceedings
1. The All Writs Act, The Anti-Injunction Act, and The Ability
to Protect Mandatory Class Actions
a. The All Writs Act
The All Writs Ace05 provides in part that, "[t]he Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.,,206 Generally speak-
ing, the Supreme Court has construed the Act to authorize a federal
court to "issue such commands ... as may be necessary or appropri-
ate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previ-
ously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained."207
The writs contemplated by the Act are ofnumerous varieties, includ-
ing writs of injunction, mandamus, and prohibition.208 In appropri-
ate circumstances, the Act empowers federal courts to issue anti-suit
injunctions directed to either federal or state courts or the rcarties
thereto, unless those injunctions are elsewhere prohibited. 09 The
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
205. § 1651(a), 62 Stat. 944 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a)
(1994».
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
207. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).
208. A writ of coram nobis brings before the court that rendered a judgment
matters of fact which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would
have prevented its rendition. The less common writs include writs of audita
querela (the initial process in an action by ajudgment defendant to obtain relief
from the judgment, typically by virtue of some matter arising since rendition of
the judgment), certiorari (a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court,
requiring a certified record of a case, to enable the issuing court to determine
whether there have been any irregularities), habeas corpus ad prosequendum
and testificandum (process to bring a prisoner before the court for trial or to tes-
tify), and ne exeat (writ forbidding its addressee from leaving, or from removing
property from, the jurisdiction of the court). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (1994), an-
notations 621-667; BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 131, 226, 709, 1031 (6th ed. 1990)
(parenthetical explanations respectively).
209. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 27 F.3d 48, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1994)
(affirming a stay of all litigation against a personal injury settlement trust);
Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470-74 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming, as in aid of
jurisdiction and to effectuate the judgment, an injunction of the prosecution of a
state court action in which plaintiffs sought to have congressional districts re-
drawn, where a federal court had imposed redistricting that was to remain in
effect until the state legislature adopted a valid redistricting plan), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1046 (1994); United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.
1988) (upholding, as modified, a preliminary injunction to preserve the federal
court's jurisdiction under the Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act).
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writs issued may extend to persons who are "in a position to frus-
trate the implementation of a court order or the proper administra-
tion of justice," whether or not they were parties to the action in
which the order was entered.210 In the situation of a mandatory pu-
nitive damages class action court entering an injunction against
class members' pursuit of punitive damages claims outside the class
action, the court ordinarily would not need to enjoin persons not par-
ties to the federal class action-so long as absent class members are
not treated as non-parties211-but perhaps cases would arise in
which this breadth of power would be needed.
At times, the Court has spoken very expansively of the judicial
action permissible under the Act. For example, in a 1977 case, the
Court quoted 1940s decisions for the propositions that the statute is
a "legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed
to achieve 'the rational ends oflaw,,,,212 and that, "[u]nless appropri-
ately confined by Congress, a federal court may avail itself of all
auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when the use
of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve
the ends ofjustice entrusted to it.,,213
Nonetheless, the power conferred by the Act has limits. For ex-
ample, it is clear in theory that the Act does not authorize courts to
issue writs as a means of acquiring jurisdiction when the courts pre-
viously had acquired none.214 In general, when matters of jurisdic-
tion have been at issue, the Court has confined the Act to "filling the
interstices of the federal judicial power when those gaps threatened
to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts' jurisdic-
t . ,,215Ion.
b. The Anti-Injunction Act and the Ability to Protect Manda-
tory Class Actions
The Anti-Injunction Act ("AlA") provides: "A court ofthe United
210. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174.
211. See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
212. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
299 (1969) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948)).
213. Id. at 172-73 (quoting Adams v. United States ex reI. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 273 (1942)).
214. See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999) (holding an injunc-
tion issued by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services to be beyond the
CAAF's appellate jurisdiction; stating that the All Writs Act does not enlarge a
court's statutory jurisdiction); Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr. v. United States
Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985) (rejecting use of the All Writs Act to en-
able the Court to review a lower court's determination where jurisdiction did
not lie under an express statutory authorization of appeal).
215. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 41 (describing the Court's
early view of the scope of the provision). However, any argument that an in-
junction against the pursuit of litigation that would interfere with federal judi-
cial control of a mandatory punitive damages class enlarges federal jurisdiction
should be rejected See also infra note 290.
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States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate itsjudgments.,,216
The "necessary in aid" exception of the AlA and its judicial in-
terpretation is of particular relevance to this Article. It paradig-
matically permits federal courts to enjoin state judicial proceedings
when the federal court has first acquired jurisdiction over real prop-
erty that is the subject of a case.217 By extension, this exception also
applies in litigation to marshal assets, administer trusts or liquidate
estates, or otherwise control particular property.218 The Court has
quite consistently insisted that this exception applies only in in-
stances where a federal court has in rem jurisdiction, and does not
apply where the court has in personam jurisdiction over the par-
ties.219 However, the Court has not been entirely consistent in so
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
217. However, the Supreme Court has yet to uphold "an injunction against
state proceedings on this basis." RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1201 (4th ed. 1996)
(citation omitted).
218. See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466-67 (1939) (holding
that the filing of trust accounts gave a state court quasi in rem jurisdiction,
which empowered it to enjoin a later federal action against the trustees for an
accounting and other relief). The holding in Princess Lida is an exception to the
general rule that "state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-
court proceedings in in personam actions." Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408, 413 (1964); see also Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (holding
it beyond the power of state courts and in conflict with the Supremacy Clause
for state courts to enjoin litigants from filing or prosecuting in personam actions
in federal courts, and stating that rights conferred by Congress cannot be
abridged by state court injunctions). See generally Alan D. Hornstein & P. Mi-
chael Nagle, State Court Power to Enjoin Federal Judicial Proceedings: Dono-
van v. City of Dallas Revisited, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1982).
219. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro.vend Corp., 433 U.s. 623, 641-42 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion) (noting that the Court "never has viewed parallel in personam
actions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either [the state or the federal]
court," and that no decision of the Court ever has held an injunction to preserve
an in personam case or controversy to fit within the "necessary in aid of its ju-
risdiction" exception); Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. 281, 294-95 (1970) (stating the principle recited in the text); Mande-
ville v. Canterbury, 318 U.s. 47, 49 (1943) (stating that this exception is neces-
sary "to prevent the impasse which would arise if the federal court were unable
to maintain its possession and control of the property, which are indispensable
to the exercise of the jurisdiction it has assumed"); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U.s. 226, 229, 230 (1922) ("Where the action is in rem ... the exercise by
the state court of jurisdiction over the same res necessarily impairs, and may
defeat, the jurisdiction of the federal court already attached. .,. But a contro-
versy is not a thing . . . and an action brought to enforce . . . a [personal] liabil-
ity does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction ofthe court in which a prior
action for the same cause is pending."). But see Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell,
149 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that the Vendo opinion
commanded only a plurality, and that the concurrence did not adopt the posi-
tion that the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception applies exclusively to in rem pro-
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limiting its application of the "necessary in aid" section of the stat-
ute. In particular, it has held the AlA to permit injunctions of vexa-
tious state court litigation involving in personam actions for dam-
ages.220 State court litigation in which plaintiffs seek punitive
damages for conduct encompassed within the course of conduct that
is the subject of a federal mandatory punitive damages class might
possibly come within this exception to the requirement of in rem ju-
risdiction.
The in rem application of the "necessary in aid" exception per-
tains to the problems addressed in this Article insofar as courts now
stretch the in rem category and regard other cases as tantamount to
falling within in rem jurisdiction.221 Some courts have analogized
the subject matter of an action or even the litigation itself to a "res,"
ceedings). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §11.2, at
699-703 (3d ed. 1999).
For criticism of the in rem limitation, see, e.g., William T. Mayton, Er-
satz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 357-
63 (1978) (criticizing, as redolent of mysticism, illogical, contrary to the lan-
guage of the statute and to Congressional intent, and of little relevance to fed-
eralism, the limitation on the utility of the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception im-
posed by application only to protect a "res"); Martin H. Redish, The Anti-
Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 717, 746-48 (1977) (stating
that, for suit injunction purposes, the distinction between in rem and in per-
sonam actions is dubious, inter alia because the cases have not persuasively ex-
plained why the impairment of a federal court's jurisdiction is greater when
concurrent actions are in rem, and the binding effects of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel seem equally to confine or impair federal jurisdiction in the two
contexts); Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Re-
form of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 302 (criticizing the in
personam/in rem distinction inter alia on the ground that it is exceedingly arti-
ficial, as recognized by the Court in the context of decisions concerning personal
jurisdiction, such as Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), and Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
220. See Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292,
298 (1924) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar injunctions
against vexatious multiple state court litigation involving in personam actions
for damages).
221. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877,881-82 (11th
Cir. 1989) (finding lengthy litigation that had generated "mountains of paper-
work ... similar to a res to be administered"); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770
F.2d 328, 337-38 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding lengthy litigation to have become the
virtual equivalent of a res, where state court actions threatened to impair the
federal court's authority to approve settlements in multi-district class litigation;
also analogizing the jurisdiction of a multidistrict court to courts acting in rem).
Both these cases rejected, as unsupported by case law holdings, the contention
that this exception to the anti-injunction act applies only to "true" in rem pro-
ceedings; see also In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 657
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (enjoining all proceedings against a personal injury
settlement trust created in a bankruptcy proceeding and also relying upon the
district court's continuing jurisdiction over the settlement trust's reorganiza-
tion). See generally 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4225, at 528-33 (2d ed. 1988
& Supp. 2001).
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or to situations that can be made subject to the federal interpleader
statute, which has been held to be an expressly authorized exception
to the AIA.222 Some commentators have straightforwardly urged
that the "necessary in aid" exception be read more broadly than the
Court has read it; and a substantial number of lower federal courts
have so construed it in order to enjoin state proceedings that would
interfere with continuing federal court jurisdiction over, and man-
agement of, protracted and complex litigation. The protected federal
litigations often involved ongoing equitable relief, and sometimes
involved class actions or multi-district litigation.223 In some in-
222. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1006 n.8 (3d Cir.) (in rea-
soning to the conclusion that a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class for punitive damages
should not have been certified because the class did not include all potential
claimants for property damage resulting from the presence of asbestos products
in buildings and structures, nor claimants for personal injury from the same
cause, commenting that, "[t]he situation here is somewhat analogous to the
problem presented by an interpleader action in which all claimants to the fund
have not been made parties"), cert. denied sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Sch. Dist.,
479 U.S. 852 (1986); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32, 38
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that "[l]imited fund class actions closely resemble
interpleader actions" and that consequently, "a stay of state proceedings would
be warranted under the 'necessary in aid of jurisdiction' exception" to the Anti-
Injunction Act). But see In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182 (8th
Cir.) (rejecting the argument that the action was akin to interpleader where the
law might limit plaintiffs to recovery of one punitive damages award from de-
fendant, inter alia because the plaintiffs' claim to punitive damages was unclear
and liability was not conceded), cert. denied sub nom. Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S.
988 (1982); In re: Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 93-7074, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22042, at *25 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995) (rejecting, for the
reasons stated in Federal Skywalk, supra, the argument that certification of a
limited fund class is functionally equivalent to an interpleader). See also Sam-
uel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 820 (1997)
(characterizing (b)(l)(B) actions as "the plaintiffs' interpleader-a mechanism
by which to avoid the 'run on the bank' risk when outstanding liabilities can be
expected to outstrip available assets").
223. See, e.g., Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 (7th Cir.
1996) (concluding, in dicta, that a district court in multi-district litigation could
issue an injunction to protect the integrity of pre-trial discovery orders, so long
as the injunction was narrowly tailored to prevent specific abuses that threat-
ened the court's ability to effectively manage the litigation); Wesch v. Folsom, 6
F.3d 1465, 1470-71 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that an exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act permitted federal court to enjoin state suit that sought congres-
sional redistricting, where federal court had issued a redistricting order to re-
main in effect until state legislature replaced it with a valid plan), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1046 (1994); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d
1332, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1981) (approving injunction of state proceedings by
plaintiffs who were parties to consolidated federal multidistrict litigation and
who were asserting state law claims substantially similar to claims whose set-
tlement had been approved, although no final judgment had yet been entered in
the federal litigation), cert. denied sub nom. Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs'
Steering Comm., 456 U.S. 936 (1982). See generally Steven M. Larimore, Ex-
ploring the Interface Between Rule 23 Class Actions and the Anti-Injunction Act,
18 GA. L. REv. 259, 292-303 (1984) (arguing that, because injunctions of state
court proceedings issued in relation to properly certified mandatory class ac-
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stances, the federal court had approved a settlement,. or was close to
doing so, and the court regarded the injunction of state court pro-
ceedings as necessary to protect and effectuate the judgments re-
sulting from these actual or imminent settlements.224 As reported by
Professors Marcus and Sherman, "a modest expansion of federal
courts' antisuit injunctive powers through application and interpre-
tions usually will be necessary to aid a federal court's jurisdiction, courts should
strongly presume that injunctions in such cases are proper, but courts also
should consider case-by-case the extent of federal and state interests in the re-
spective litigations, the litigants' interests, and systemic and policy concerns
such as efficiently providing adequate relief to the greatest number of injured
parties); Redish, supra note 219, at 748-60 (arguing for liberalized interpreta-
tion of the ''in aid of jurisdiction" clause to give federal courts power to enjoin
any concurrent state proceeding that threatens the effective exercise of federal
jurisdiction, but constraining exercises of that power by the sound use of discre-
tion).
Many of the cases cited above involved post-judgment federal injunc-
tions of state court litigation, defensible under the re-litigation exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act. As such, the courts' conclusions concerning the "necessary
in aid of jurisdiction" exception were, at most, alternative holdings, and. have
less authoritative effect than they would have ifthe "necessary in aid" exception
were the sole basis for the decisions. See Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d
445,453 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that, under federal preclusion principles, hold-
ings in the alternative, either of which independently would be sufficient to
support the result of a case, are not conclusive with respect to either issue
standing alone, since neither determination is essential to the judginent), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1059 (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i
(1982) (explaining that "a determination in the alternative may not have been
as carefully or rigorously considered as it would have been if it had been neces-
sary to the result" and that the principle recommended in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments, by limiting issue preclusion, discourages appeals). But see
Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REv. 945, 969
& n.104 (1998) (finding through empirical study that, notwithstanding the view
taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, many and perhaps most fed-
eral courts give issue preclusive effect to each alternative holding).
224. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024-25 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding court empowered by the All Writs Act, the Anti-Injunction Act,
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d), to stay a state class action that directly contravened a
prior injunction against such a proceeding, entered in a nationwide class action,
and further holding the temporary approval of a nationwide settlement in the
federal class action to have stayed the state class action); Carlough v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 202-04 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that district court could
preliminarily enjoin plaintiff class members from prosecuting similar state
court class action in light of imminent settlement offederal action after years of
negotiation, plaintiffs' effort to challenge propriety of federal suit in state court,
and plaintiffs' right to opt out of the federal suit). But see In re Fed. Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1181-83 (8th Cir.) (reversing, as in violation of the Anti-
Injunction Act, a mandatory class certification which prohibited class members
from settling punitive damages claims and effectively enjoined state plaintiffs
from pursuing pending state court actions on issues ofliability), cert. denied sub
nom. Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler
Shops, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 16, 17-18 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that Anti-
Injunction Act prohibited federal court from enjoining federal class members
from continuing in personam state actions concerning same issues, although it
permitted an injunction against the institution of new state proceedings).
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tation of the Anti-Injunction Act and of the All-Writs Act" has oc-
curred in two situations: bankruptcy, and when injunction of com-
peting litigation was necessary to allow a federal court to preserve
the assets available for settlement.225
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the applicability of
the "necessary in aid" exception to duplicative complex litigation.
The Court has said, however, that any injunction must be "neces-
sary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal
court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair
the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case.,,226
While limiting, this pronouncement also holds promise for allowing
injunctions of state court proceedings that, while not in rem, do
threaten seriously to interfere with a federal court's ability to decide
d · b fi 't 227a case or cases pen mg e ore 1 .
In the class action context, strong arguments have been made in
favor of injunctions to protect mandatory class actions, including
those properly certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), to protect a limited
fund. The arguments in support of injunctions against potentially
interfering state suits, made under the "necessary in aid of jurisdic-
tion" exception to the AlA and relevant to (b)(1)(B) classes, include
the ideas that, absent the ability to enjoin previously commenced
state court litigation, mandatory classes are not truly mandatory,228
and that an anti-suit injunction is necessary to protect the court's
jurisdiction to determine and equitably allocate punitive damages.229
One also could argue that, by making certain types of classes
mandatory, Congress has expressly authorized an inJunction of
other suits by class members asserting the same claims.20
225. RICHARD L. MARcus & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 369-71 (3d ed. 1998).
226. Atl. Coast Line RR v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs., 398 U.S. 281, 295
(1970) (emphasizing that federal courts lack inherent and unlimited power to
ignore the bounds of anti-injunction statutes and to stay state court proceed-
ings).
227. But see Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1160 n.49
(1998) (questioning such reliance on this language because of the Court's view
that parallel in personam cases do not interfere with one another or with either
court's exercise ofjurisdiction).
228. Fed. Skywalk, 680 F.2d at 1191-93 (Heaney, J., dissenting). While a
plaintiff can simultaneously pursue duplicative litigation in state and federal
courts, if the state court action goes to judgment first, deciding the asserted
claim and determining what relief is appropriate, that will effectively remove
the particular plaintiff from the federal class action and, by so doing, effectively
undermine the mandatory nature of membership in the plaintiff class.
229. See, e.g., id. at 1192 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (observing that restricting
class members so that they are unable to pursue punitive damages claims in
independent actions is absolutely necessary to the class action court's jurisdic-
tion over the punitive damages issue).
230. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972) (describing the test to be
applied to determine whether a federal statute expressly authorizes an injunc-
tion of state court proceedings as "whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating
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But arguments also run to the contrary: nothing in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions explicitly permits
district courts to enjoin overlapping state court actions,231 and noth-
ing in the AlA expressly treats class actions any differently than
other litigation. Although the "necessary in aid" exception might be
very useful in situations where mandatory class actions are appro-
priate, the longstanding (if dubious) principle that in personam ac-
tions may proceed concurrently232 has posed a substantial obstacle to
federal injunction of most state court suits that arguably would in-
terfere with federal jurisdiction over class actions.233 The prohibition
against construction of the Federal Rules to extend the jurisdiction
of the district courts234 also has been argued to preclude an expan-
sive reading of the Anti-Injunction Act's "necessary in aid" exception
that would allow injunctions of in personam state suits where the
jurisdiction to be protected is made possible by Rule 23.235 I, how-
ever, find this argument unpersuasive. While Rule 23 authorizes
class actions, it does not expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Only those class actions that satisfY the requirements for
federal question or diversity jurisdiction can be pursued. Thus, the
jurisdiction to be protected when federal courts are adjudicating
class actions is made possible by the usual jurisdictional statutes,
although the scope of the action to be protected is made possible by
Rule 23.236 I believe that the arguments in support of anti-suit in-
junctions entered to protect federal jurisdiction over properly certi-
fied mandatory class actions should carry the day.
With respect to the argument that Rule 23(b)(l) is an express
congressional authorization of injunctions under the AlA, additional
hurdles are posed: namely, (a) whether Rule 23(b)(1) is sufficiently
a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given
its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding").
231. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23. By contrast, statutory interpleader provides
that a district court may restrain all claimants "from instituting or prosecuting
any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, in-
strument or obligation involved in the interpleader action." 28 U.S.C. § 2361
(1994).
232. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182-83 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Stover v. Rau, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). In order to avoid ex-
haustion of the defendant's available assets and avoid legal restrictions that
might curtail the ability of some class members to recover punitive damages,
the district court had enjoined class members from settling punitive damages
claims they had asserted in other litigation, until the class action trial was con-
cluded. See id. at 1177-80. The appeals court vacated the injunction, rejecting
the argument that the injunction was necessary in aid of the court's jurisdic-
tion, relying in part on the principle cited in the text. Id. at 1182-83.
234. FED. R. Crv. P. 82 (providing in part that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure "shall not be construed to extend ... the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts").
235. See Wood, supra note 219, at 315.
236. See also infra note 262.
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explicit to satisfY the AlA; (b) whether Rule 23 constitutes an Act of
Congress for purposes of the AlA exception allowing injunctions ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress; and (c) whether reading Rule
23 as the basis of an exception to the AlA would "abridge, enlarge,
or modifY' a substantive right, in violation of the Rules Enabling
Act.237 Under the test articulated in Mitchum v. Foster238 it easily
can be found that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) could not be given its intended
scope, absent the stay of competing state court proceedings, in light
of the ability of such proceedings entirely to frustrate the purposes
of the class certification. However, whether the Rule creates a fed-
eral right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity (as re-
quired by Mitchum) is more debatable. One reasonably could argue
that allowance of a class action for the purpose of preventing adjudi-
cations that would (1) dispose of the interests of other persons not
party thereto, or (2) substantially impair or impede the ability of
those other persons to protect their interests, is the creation of a
right or remedy, and it is enforceable in a federal court of equity. I
return later to the issues labeled (b) and (c) above, in connection
with discussion of a proposed new subsection of Rule 23 that would
explicitly authorize federal class action courts to enjoin other litiga-
tion, in described circumstances.239
Like the "necessary in aid" exception, the authorization of in-
junctions to protect or effectuate federal judgments, the third excep-
237. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 217, at 1206 n.9 (posing these ques-
tions). Federal statutes explicitly authorizing federal injunctions of state court
proceedings are the Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994), and bankruptcy
law, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. 1999), whose injunctive provisions are in-
tended to permit all claims to a limited fund that has been made the subject of a
statutory interpleader action or a bankruptcy proceeding, respectively, to be de-
cided in one action so as to prevent inconsistent determinations or inequitable
distribution of the limited fund. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the only statute that the
Court has found to imply a power to enjoin state court proceedings. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, at 698.
As to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and orders entered pursuant to
them, see In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988) (in a case in
which the court issued mandamus to vacate district court orders certifying a
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action and staying all related litigation, concluding in
dicta that these orders did not seem to be authorized by Act of Congress, or nec-
essary in aid of the court's jurisdiction); see also Larimore, supra note 223, at
278-84 (discussing the argument of express authorization by Congress and pos-
sible difficulties with it, including the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are not literally an act or acts of Congress although, by otherwise provid-
ing by law, Congress can prevent any proposed Rule from being promulgated;
see 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994»; cf. Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1331-32
(5th Cir.) (refusing to construe Rule 23(d), authorizing trial courts to make
whatever orders are appropriate to manage a class action, as an express excep-
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act, on the grounds that the Rule fails the test laid
down in Mitchum u. Foster), cert..denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985) (same as Piambino, supra).
238. 407 U.S. 225 (1972); see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
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tion to the AlA, is intended to ensure the effectiveness and suprem-
acy of federallaw,240 while also helping to prevent parties from en-
gaging in harassing relitigation tactics.241 It allows federal courts to
enjoin state proceedings if, but only insofar as, necessary to ensure
the preclusive effect of earlier federal decisions on the merits.242
Founded upon res judicata and collateral estoppel, this exception
''was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of
an issue . . . previously . . . decided by the federal court,,,243 and to
limit harassment, by repetitious litigation, of successful federalliti-
gants. While this provision would have relevance when a mandatory
punitive damages class action has gone to judgment, federal courts
would want to stop competing punitive damages suits before the
class action went to judgment.
The Court has found that the three statutory exceptions to the
AlA are exclusive,244 except when the Act is inapplicable.245
240. Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (citing the need to ensure
supremacy of federal law as a reason for the "necessary in aid" exception).
241. See JEAN R STERNLIGIIT, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions:
Federal Courts' Use ofAntisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 91, 127 (1998). The exception also serves interests in efficiency. Id. at
124.
242. See 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994); Choo, 486 U.S. at 146-51 (rejecting an in-
junction against state court proceedings insofar as it was broader than neces-
sary to protect or effectuate the federal court's forum non conveniens dismissal,
but permitting the injunction insofar as it effectuated the federal court's choice
of law decision regarding another of plaintiffs claims); Atl. Coast Line RR v.
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs., 398 U.S. 281, 290 (1970) (overturning an injunction
against the enforcement of a state court injunction where the prior district court
order had not addressed the propriety of a state court injunction); see also
Steans v. Combined Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding im-
proper a district court's judgment purporting to bind nonparties over whom it
lacked jurisdiction, and enjoining those persons from seeking punitive damages
from the defendant in state court based on a need to protect its prior judgment),
cert. denied sub nom. Combined Ins. Co. v. Aldridge, 526 U.S. 1068 (1999). See
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 11.2.4, at 703-05.
The lower federal courts are slightly split as to whether the relitigation
exception applies to only those matters that were actually litigated or to allliti-
gation that is precluded; res judicata may bar matters that could have been liti-
gated but were not. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 11.2.4, at 705 (noting the
confusion in the lower federal courts); 17 WRIGIIT ETAL., supra note 221, § 4226,
at 541-46 (commenting on lower federal courts' diverse application of the reliti-
gation exception).
243. Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988).
244. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S.
511, 514-16 (1955).
245. The Court has held it to be inapplicable in some suits brought by the
United States or federal agencies and when the party requesting injunctive re-
lief was neither a party, nor in privity with a party, to the state court proceed-
ing sought to be enjoined. County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 59-60
(1980) (implying that the AIA does not bar injunctions sought by strangers to
the state court proceeding sought to be enjoined); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404
U.S. 138,144-47 (1971) (holding that an injunction sought by the NLRB against
state court action preempted by the National Labor Relations Act falls within
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Of course, even when an injunction may issue under the All
Writs and Anti-Injunction Acts, that permissibility "does not mean
that [an injunction] must issue.,,246 Traditional equity doctrines-
such as those requiring irreparable injury if the injunction did not
issue and lack of an adequate remedy at law-constrain the federal
courts' issuance of anti-suit injunctions,247 as they do the exercise of
any power under the All Writs Act.248 Thus, the decision whether to
grant an anti-suit injunction may be influenced by such factors as
whether the state suit is vexatious, whether the party seeking an in-
junction has so delayed in seeking relief as to have waived the right
to seek an injunction or to be estopped from doing so, and whether
there is need for speedier or surer relief than a state court plea of
res judicata or collateral estoppel is likely to afford.249
When an anti-suit injunction does issue from a federal court,
states are theoretically obligated to honor it under the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause and full faith and credit principles,250 although
the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act for suits brought by the United States);
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1957) (concluding
that the Act does not prohibit the US. from obtaining an injunction of state
proceedings to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest).
Certain other parties and proceedings also have been held to be beyond the
scope of the Act. See LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS
AND JURISDICTION § 12.02[51 (1998).
246. Choo, 486 US. at 151 (emphasis in original).
247. See, e.g., Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. Victa, 936 F.2d 466,468 (9th
Cir. 1991) (observing that the issuance of an injunction is discretionary and
that "general principles of equity, comity and federalism" should guide a court
empowered by the All Writs and the Anti-Injunction Acts to grant an injunc-
tion); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,927
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "[t1he equitable circumstances surrounding each
request for an injunction must be carefully examined to determine whether ...
the injunction is required to prevent an irreparable miscarriage ofjustice").
248. See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 US. 529, 537 (1999) (stating that "[t1he
All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such,
not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at
law").
249. See, e.g., Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914 F.2d 717,720-21 (5th
Cir. 1990) (upholding exercise of discretion to enjoin relitigation of choice oflaw
issue, made pursuant to a forum non conveniens dismissal, where cost of reliti-
gation would have irreparably injured the defendant), cert. denied sub nom.
Quintero v. Torvald Klaveness & Co. NS, 499 US. 925 (1991); Harrelson v.
United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming exercise of discretion
to enjoin litigants who are harassing their opponents from undertaking any fu-
ture litigation on any claims arising from the facts at issue). See generally 17
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 221, § 4226, at 548, 552-53 (noting relevance of bad
faith, multiplicity of suits, or other evidence of harassment, as well as the pos-
sibility of waiver or estoppel).
250. US. CaNsT. art. VI, c1.2 (declaring that the "Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
bethe supreme Law of the Land"); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 217, at
1203-04 (the Supremacy Clause obliges state courts to stay their proceedings if
federal law so dictates); see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda
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the enforcement of such an injunction typically is left to the court
that entered it.251
2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 23
In April, 2001, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the
U.S. Judicial Conference approved proposed changes to Rule 23,
some of which have relevance to the issues under discussion here.
However, at the request of the A9,visory Committee, the Standing
Committee of the Conference deferred consideration of the provi-
sions relevant to this Article. The plan is for the Subcommittee on
Class Actions to revise and re-submit these proposals.252 Most perti-
nent is proposed Rule 23(g) which, as originally submitted to the
Standing Committee, provided:
(g) Related class actions. (1) When a person sues or is sued as
a representative of a class, the court may-before deciding
whether to certify a class or after certifying a class-enter an
order directed to any member of the proposed or certified class
that prohibits filing or pursuing a class action in any other
court that involves the class claims, issues, or defenses [but
the court may not prohibit a class member from filing or pur-
suing a state-court action on behalf of persons who reside or
were injured in the forum state and who assert claims that
arise under the law of the forum state]. In entering an order
under this Rule 23(g)(1) the court must make findings that:
(A) the other litigation will interfere with the court's ability to
achieve the purposes of the class litigation,
(B) the order is necessary to protect against interference by
other litigation, and
(0) the need to protect against interference by other litigation
is greater than the class member's need to pursue other litiga-
tion.
Band of Seneca Indians, 94 F.3d 747, 754 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that federal
law determines whether and to what extent federal judgments have preclusive
effects in subsequent state court litigation); Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d
1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1991) (indicating that a federal injunction requiring adher-
ence to the federal law imposes no inappropriate burden on a state); Haskins v.
Stanton 794 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that where a federal stat-
ute imposes a burden on a state, an injunction requiring the state to comply
with the statute "merely seeks to prevent· the defendants from shirking their
responsibilities under it").
251. See Baker ex rei Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236
(1998) (noting that sanctions for violation of an injunction generally are im-
posed by the court that issued the injunction).
252. Cooper, supra note 195, at 457.
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(2) In lieu of an order under Rule 23(g)(1), the court may stay
its own proceedings to coordinate with proceedings in another
court, and may defer the decision whether to certify a class
notwithstanding Rule 23(c)(1)(A).
(3) The court may consult with other courts, state or federal, in
determining whether to enter an order under Rule 23(g)(1) or(2).253
This is obviously not the place for a thorough evaluation of this
proposal.254 A few points, however, are worth making. First, this
provision is among those proposed to help address the various prob-
lems created by duplicative class litigation in state court. The
threats of multiple and excessive punitive damages awards, inequi-
tably distributed, are among the problems created by parallellitiga-
tion in multiple fora. Thus, to the extent that proposed Rule 23(g)'s
prohibition on filing and pursuit of overlapping class actions would
be effective, it would help to avoid those punitive damages prob-
lems.255 The Advisory Notes also indicate that the powers conferred
in proposed Rule 23(g) are intended to fulfill the purposes of the
class action, specifically to provide protection that is most evidently
needed in (b)(l) classes, which themselves were established "for the
very purpose of protecting against the effects of competing litigation
that may . . . prevent effective protection of all class members'
'ht ,,256rig s.
Indeed, the Advisory Committee could well have had punitive
damages awards in mind when it wrote, "[s]pecial occasions to pro-
tect the federal action may arise when a (b)(l) or (b)(2) class pre-
sents pressing needs to achieve uniformity of obligation and to en-
253. Other proposed amendments allow federal courts to direct that no other
court certify a class substantially similar to that which the directing court has
refused to certify (or has decertified) to pursue substantially similar claims or
defenses unless a difference of law or fact changes the certification issue, Pro-
posed Rule 23(c)(1)(D), and, absent changed circumstances, prohibits any court
from approving substantially the same settlement that another federal court
has refused to approve for a certified class, Proposed Rule 23(e)(5). Still other of
the proposed amendments address: the timing of certification decisions, Rule
23(c)(1) and of notice, Rule 23(c)(2); judicial oversight of settlements, Rule 23(e);
attorney appointment, Rule 23(h); and attorney compensation, Rule 23(i).
254. Professor Edward Cooper of the University of Michigan Law School and
Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has prepared memoranda
addressing, inter alia, the consistency of these provisions with the Rules Ena-
bling Act and the Anti-Injunction Act. See Cooper, supra note 195, at 462.
Other evaluations will surely follow.
255. The language bracketed within the proposed Rule is said to "attempt to
acknowledge the important interest of the states in controlling truly in-state
litigation while recognizing that the federal interest in managing the class ac-
tion before the federal court may take precedence over a competing multi-state
class action brought in state court." Proposed FED. R. Crv. P. 23(g) advisory
committee's notes.
256. Id.
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sure equality among class members," and "[e]ven in state-law cases,
a federal court may be concerned to protect against the conse-
quences of pursuing claims arising out [of] multistate events in
many independent actions.,,257 A rather gaping hole in that protec-
tion seems to exist in the Rule's failure to authorize injunctions
against individual (that is, non-class) suits. However, proposed Rule
23(g) addresses only related class actions. As this Article has dis-
cussed above, federal courts already have the power to enjoin litiga-
tion that falls within one of the exceptions to the AlA, including
when necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction.258 That pro-
vision may suffice to empower federal courts to enjoin individual
litigation that would interfere with mandatory punitive damages
class actions.
In a memorandum addressing Rules Enabling Act authority to
deal with overlapping class actions in this manner among others,
Professor Cooper has tentatively opined that proposed Rule 23(g)
would be properly promulgated; that is, that it (1) would really regu-
late procedure, "the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress,,,259 in the "interest of speedy, fair and exact determina-
tion of the truth,,,260 for its purpose is to support the procedural goals
of Rule 23; and (2) that it would not abridge, enlarge or modify a
substantive right, in violation of the Act, for any effect that it would
have on substantive rights would be incidental; nor (3) would it
impermissibly expand federal subject matter jurisdiction.261 Noting
that, "it seems to be accepted that Rule 23 itself is generally within
Enabling Act authority,,,262 and finding traces of evidence that the
Supreme Court is attentive to the purposes of class actions and
would support amendments designed to better fulfill those purposes,
Professor Cooper set forth the argument that
257. [d.
258. See supra notes 217-36 and accompanying text.
259. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1940).
260. [d.
261. Cooper, supra note 195, at 459-62. Cooper also wrote:
[tjhere is substantial authority that § 2283 does not limit subject-
matter jurisdiction, but operates only to limit the injunction remedy.
See 17 Federal Practice & Procedure 2d, § 4422, p. 514. To that ex-
tent, a rule that qualifies a remedial limit does not expand jurisdic-
tion. And there is little force to the possible argument that federal ju-
risdiction is enlarged by an injunction that, by ousting state-court
jurisdiction, effectively transforms a statutory grant of concurrent
federal jurisdiction into an unauthorized assertion of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The injunction is simply an exercise of established juris-
diction, such as occurs in any other situation where an anti-suit in-
junction is proper because a § 2283 exception applies or because §
2283 itself does not apply.
[d. at 465.
262. Cooper, supra note 195, at 460.
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[a] federal court, if it certifies a class, is acting within the
framework of a general procedural rule to create a legal con-
struct-the class-that can fulfill the reasons for its creation
only if protected against the intrusion of other class litiga-
tion . . .. Fulfillment of the procedure, and effective imple-
mentation of the jurisdictional authority that supports resort
to federal procedure, require that the class be protected in
much the same way that a court is authorized to protect the
res that supports in rem jurisdiction.263 . .. Proposed Rule
23(g) is necessazx to maintain the integrity of federal class-
action procedure. 64
In so arguing, Professor Cooper simultaneously supported the
validity of proposed Rule 23(g) under the Enabling Act, and argued
for the propriety of the proposed Rule under the "necessary in aid"
prong of the AlA. Having done so, he reminded the reader that even
so, the wisdom of adopting the proposed Rule (and implicitly, wise
application of the Rule), which "touches highly sensitive relation-
ships between federal and state courts ... depend[s] on the severity
and persistence of the threats [that] competing litigation poses to
fulfillment of Rule 23's purposes.,,265
In a separate memorandum, Professor Cooper addressed, inter
alia, whether such a Rule could constitute an express authorization
by Congress, within the meaning of the first exception to the AlA.
He proffered the argument that a Rule that
legitimately implements Enabling Act authority may seem to
fit. It is the Enabling Act that expressly authorizes the rule
that expressly authorizes stays and like orders addressed to
members of a federal class. [And] [t]he supercession provi-
sion266 ... underscores the status of Enabling Act rules as the
equivalent ofActs of Congress.267
Finally, Professor Cooper added that, if the argument that the
Rule constitutes an express authorization by Congress fails, injunc-
tions entered under the Rule can remain valid as within the AlA ex-
ception for injunctions necessary in aid of the federal courts' juris-
263. Id. at 461.
264. Id. at 462.
265. Id. Professor Cooper goes further (as I read him) to say that "the
broader anti-injunction policy of § 2283, drawn from deeply rooted concepts of
comity and federalism, must be considered in determining whether proposed
Rule 23(g) really is a rule of practice and procedure, and really does not imper-
missibly abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." (emphasis added).
266. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), provides in part that,
"[a]lllaws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect." Id. at 464
267. Cooper, supra note 195, at 464. These arguments assume the validity
of the proposed Rule under the Enabling Act; however, this is not free from
doubt.
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diction.268
The need for federal judicial authority to enjoin litigation that
would interfere with properly certified mandatory classes is re-
flected in the now-tabled proposed amendments to Rule 23. If it is
determined that mandatory punitive damages classes can be prop-
erly certified, one can hope that the courts will protect those certifi-
cations, utilizing their powers under the All Writs Act, under
amendments to Rule 23, should they become law, and under excep-
tions to the AlA.
B. State Court Injunctions ofState Court Proceedings
State courts ordinarily lack power to enjoin federal judicial pro-
ceedings.269 They are not similarly disabled from enjoining persons
from filing or prosecuting proceedings pending in the courts of an-
other state or states,270 but will do so only in limited circumstances.
The verbal formulations describing when state courts will enjoin ac-
tions in other states include such phrases as: "sparingly," "only in
the most compelling circumstances,,,271 and where "a clear equity is
presented requiring the interposition of the court to prevent a mani-
fest wrong and injustice.,,272 Appropriate circumstances may exist
when the litigation to be enjoined is viewed as vexatious or harass-
ing, and when the goal is to prevent a multiplicity of suits,273 to pro-
tect the court's own jurisdiction or prevent evasion of important pub-
268. Id. at 465.
269. The general rule is that "state courts are completely without power to
restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions." Donovan v. City of
Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964); see also Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12,
16 (1977) (holding it beyond the power of state courts, and in conflict with the
Supremacy Clause, for state courts to enjoin litigants from filing or prosecuting
in personam actions in federal courts; stating that rights conferred by Congress
cannot be abridged by the states). But see Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S.
456, 466-68 (1939) (holding that the filing of trust accounts gave a state court
quasi in rem jurisdiction which empowered it to enjoin a later federal action
against the trustees for an accounting and other relief). See generally Horn-
stein & Nagle, supra note 218.
270. See, e.g., Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305-06 (Tex. 1986) (con-
cluding that state courts have power to restrain persons from proceeding with
suits filed in other states); Eddy ex rel. Pfeifer v. Christian Sci. Bd. ofDirs., 379
N.E.2d 653, 654-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (same). Even if courts sometimes speak
in terms of injunctions against actions or against the prosecution of actions,
these injunctions are directed to parties, rather than to courts. Kleinschmidt v.
Kleinschmidt, 99 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (so stating).
271. See, e.g., Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 306 (stating the standard as "sparingly
and only by reason of very special circumstances"; also referring to "most
compelling circumstance[s]").
272. Royal League v. Kavanagh, 84 N.E. 178, 181 (Ill. 1908); see also
Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307 (asking whether an "injunction is required to pre-
vent an irreparable miscarriage ofjustice").
273. See, e.g., Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 307 (discussing the appropriateness of
an injunction to prevent multiplicity or to protect against vexatious or harass-
ing litigation).
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lic policies of the forum state,274 or to restrain a state citizen from
prosecuting, in the court of a foreign state, an action that will result
. fr d . 275III a au, gross wrong, or oppressIOn.
The reticence of states to attempt injunctions of proceedings in
other states is attributable, at least in part, to the understanding
that the court in which an enjoined action is pending may proceed
with the litigation nonetheless, at least in the absence of a final
judgment which is entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.276 The Court in dicta specifi-
cally addressed anti-suit injunctions in Baker v. General Motors
Corp.,277 in the context ofholding that an injunction barring a former
GM employee from testifying against GM did not control proceed-
ings outside Michigan, the state of the court that entered the injunc-
tion.278 It noted that "anti-suit injunctions regarding litigation else-
where, even if compatible with due process as a direction
constraining parties to the decree ... in fact have not controlled the
second court's actions regarding litigation in that court.,,279 In a
footnote, the Court added, "[t]his Court ... has not yet ruled on the
credit due to a state-court injunction barring a party from maintain-
ing litigation in another State.280 State courts that have dealt with
the question have, in the main, regarded antisuit injunctions as out-
side the full faith and credit ambit.,,281
The reasoning in Baker, including its concern that the courts of
one state not interfere with the jurisdiction of courts of other
states,282 indicates agreement with this weight of authority. It ap-
274. See, e.g., id. (referring to courts that have entered anti-suit injunctions
on these bases, and looking to these factors itself); see also Kleinschmidt, 99
N.E.2d at 627-28 (discussing similar principles).
275. See, e.g., Kavanagh, 84 N.E. at 181 (so stating).
276. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Court in Baker ex rel Thomas v. General
Motors Corp. indicated that equity decrees are within the ambit of the states'
full faith and credit obligations. 522 U.S. 222, 234 (1998).
277. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
278. Id. at 236
279. Id. (citing, in support of the latter proposition, James v. Grand Trunk
W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 867 (Ill. 1958); and SCOLES & HAy, supra note 19, at
981). See generally 17 WRIGHT E:T AL., supra note 221, § 4467, at 635 (1981 &
2001 Supplement) (noting that "[aJ second state need not directly enforce an in-
junction entered by another state ...").
280. Baker, 522 U.S. at 236 n.9 (citing Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of
Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82
HARv. L. REV. 798, 823 (1969); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity
Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REv. 183, 198 (1957) ("urging that ... 'full faith and credit
does not require dismissal of an action whose prosecution has been enjoined,' for
to hold otherwise 'would mean in effect that the courts of one state can control
what goes on in the courts of another'''».
281. Baker, 522 U.S. at 236 n.9 (citing Ginsburg, supra note 280, for the
view that the current state of the law, permitting issuance of anti-suit injuncc
tions but not compelling deference to them outside the rendering state, may be
the most reasonable compromise position).
282. See id. at 240.
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pears that, just as the Michigan decree in Baker could not command
obedience elsewhere because the Michigan courts lacked authority
to determine who could testifY before the courts of another state,28B
an anti-suit injunction cannot command obedience elsewhere be-
cause the injunction-issuing court lacks authority to decide whether
particular cases shall proceed before the tribunals of another state.
Thus, the court that enters an injunction has no power to ensure
that sister-state proceedings will cease in the manner it has di-
rected, although it can sanction parties before it who have disobeyed
its injunction.284 Another state may respect an anti-suit injunction
as a matter of comity, although it is not obligated to do SO.285
All of the same reasons that "argue" that a federal court should
be able to enjoin state court proceedings that would interfere with
the federal court's jurisdiction over a defendant's liability for puni-
tive damages, occasioned by a particular course of conduct, when the
court has properly certified a mandatory punitive damages class,28B
apply with equal force when a state court has properly certified the
mandatory punitive damages class. In light of the injunction-
entering court's impotence to enforce its injunction except through
the imposition of sanctions upon disobedient parties, one can only
hope that the courts of sister states would be wise enough to decline
to proceed with litigation that has been enjoined in these circum-
stances, both in the interest of comity and in the interests of the
plaintiffs and the defendants who gain protection from a single
court's control over punitive damages for a defined course of con-
duct.
C. Personal Jurisdiction to Enjoin
It appears to be well accepted that a federal court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over persons who are or were full-fledged par-
ties to federal court litigation, for the purpose of enjoining those in-
dividuals from commencing or prosecuting state court litigation287
that would interfere with the jurisdiction the federal court is exer-
283. Id. at 241.
284. See id. at 236 (stating that "[slanctions for violations of an injunction
... are generally administered by the court that issued the injunction"); Leman
v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 452 (1932) (holding valid a
Massachusetts district court's assessment of a penalty against a party who vio-
lated that court's injunction in Michigan); see also Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d
626, 628 (2d Cir. 1963) (indicating that enforcement is left to the injunction-
rendering forum).
285. See, e.g., Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304,306-07 (Tex. 1986); Klein-
schmidt v. Kleinschmidt, 99 N.E.2d 623, 626 (TIl. App. Ct. 1951).
286. See supra notes 217-68 and accompanying text.
287. The Anti-Injunction Act does not apply until state proceedings have be-
gun, but the consequence is that a federal court may restrain a party from insti-
tuting state proceedings, with no interference by the Anti-Injunction Act. See
17 WRIGHTET AL., supra note 221, § 4222, at 506-07.
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cising or with a federal court judgment, if one has been entered.288
The same should be true of similarly situated state courts. The per-
sonal jurisdiction exercised over defendants pursuant to applicable
long-arm statutes and the U.S. Constitution, and over plaintiffs by
virtue of their consensual submission to the court's jurisdiction in
the initial litigation, should be understood to encompass jurisdiction
to enjoin those same parties from commencing or pursuing state
court litigation that would interfere with the class action court's ju-
risdiction or judgment.
When a federal court enters an anti-suit injunction that pur-
ports to enjoin persons who were strangers to the federal litigation
or persons who were among the absent members of a class on whose
behalf, or against whom, the federal suit was litigated, the court's
288. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
110-12 (1969) (injunction is ineffective insofar as it is directed at persons over
whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction); Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d
1196, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding an anti-suit injunction of a parallel state
court suit to be appropriate to protect a § 1407 transferee court's discovery or-
der as to, but only as to, those persons and counsel whose cases were or had
been part of the multidistrict litigation); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d
832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that, "no court can make a decree which will
bind anyone but a party ... [If] a court of equity [or of law assumes to] enjoin
the world at large, ... the decree is pro tanto brutum fulmen, and the persons
enjoined are free to ignore it."). Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
purports to allow federal courts to enjoin not only parties but also those persons
in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the or-
der by personal service or otherwise. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). On occasion, that
provision may be invoked in cases involving anti-suit injunctions against the
absent members of plaintiff classes. See, e.g., In re Bolar Pharm. Co., Generic
Drug Consumer Litig., MDL No. 849, 1994 WL 326522, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 5,
1994).
If no state proceeding exists when the federal court is asked to enter an
injunction, but a state action is commenced before the federal court enters the
injunction, the circuits are split on whether the court may enter the injunction
only if an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies. The First, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits have held the AIA to be inapplicable in the circumstances de-
scribed. See Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 842 n.6 (1st
Cir. 1988) (citing Barancik and National City Lines with approval; for a discus-
sion of Barancik and National City Lines, see infra); Nat'l City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 1982) ("The Anti-Injunction Act is in-
applicable when a federal court has first obtained jurisdiction of a matter in
controversy by the institution of suit."); Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp.,
489 F.2d 933, 937-38 (7th Cir. 1973) (reasoning that ifthe AIA applied upon the
mere commencement of a state action, then "a federal court [taking] time for
fair consideration of the merits of a request for an injunction [would] deliberate
at its peril; its authority to rule on the pending motion could be terminated by
the action of one of the litigants"). The Sixth Circuit has held the other way.
See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 532-34 (6th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting the Barancik rationale on the grounds that it "runs afoul of the lan-
guage of the Act and of clear authority which insists that the language be read
literally"); see also Nat'l City Lines, 687 F.2d at 1135 (Arnold, J., dissenting)
(arguing against "any steps that erode the independence and autonomy of the
state courts").
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jurisdiction to enjoin those persons from commencing or pursuing
state court litigation is far less clear, particularly if those individu-
als lack minimum contacts with the relevant sovereign. I have
elsewhere explored these personal jurisdiction issues as they arise
in opt-out and in mandatory class actions, and have considered
whether it matters whether the litigation to be enjoined is a collat-
eral attack on a class action judgment or merely related or overlap-
ping litigation.289 In the context of mandatory limited generosity
classes, my view is this: although there is some uncertainty as to the
circum·stances under which a judgment in a Rule 23(b)(1) class ac-
tion will satisfy due process and bind the members of the class,29o I
believe that, when those circumstances are present, they should suf-
fice to subject the class members to the personal jurisdiction of the
class court for purposes of being enjoined from commencing or
prosecuting state court litigation, the injunction of which is other-
wise proper under the AlA. This should be the result in order to
give meaning to the notion that these members are to be bound by
the judgment. If these class members are to be so bound, it must be
289. See Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal
Under the All Writs Act, Part II: Special Considerations Applicable to Anti-Suit
Injunctions, 80 B.u. L. REv. 773, 855-73 (2000).
290. It typically is said that the members of mandatory classes are bound by
the judgment so long as their due process rights are fulfilled, but the Supreme
Court has not definitively determined what due process requires. These class
members must be adequately represented but, under Rule 23, such class mem-
bers are not entitled to notice of the action or the concomitant opportunities to
be heard or to opt out; and the Court never has held that they must have mini-
mum contacts with the forum. The Rule contemplates that they will be bound
without their having manifested any consent to the court's jurisdiction. See
generally Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1
(1986) (proposing, inter alia, a four-factor analysis for determining the propriety
of mandatory class certifications); 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 221, § 1789, at
Supp. 43 (noting that the issue whether there is a constitutional right to opt out
is acute when actions involving money damages are certified under Rule
23(b)(I) or (2), and that, over a dissent joined by four Justices, the Supreme
Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted in a case-Ticor Title Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)-that could have
posed that question).
One argument that at least sometimes could be made in support of ju-
risdiction absent minimum contacts, although not without constitutionally ade-
quate notice and opportunity to be heard, would be based on an analogy to Mul-
lane v. Cen. Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), where the Court upheld
jurisdiction, concluding that:
the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of
its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond
doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
resident or nonresident ....
Id. at 313. In cases certified under Rule 23(b)(I) and (2), there often is a practi-
cal necessity that there be one forum that can decide the controversy and bind
all interested parties.
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within the court's power to bind them to it by enjoining litigation ac-
tivity that otherwise would uhdermine the federal court's jurisdic-
tion or its judgment.291 This conclusion is defensible in part because
the injunctions at issue here are more like mandatory or prohibitory
orders entered as a matter of case management (to which class
members certainly are subject) than they are to injunctions of non-
litigation activity, the propriety ofwhich rests on a determination of
the merits.292 It is highly likely that anti-suit injunctions are not the
sort of coercive judicial action to which defendants are subject as a
remedy for wrongdoing, and vulnerability to which requires such
procedural protections as the minimum contacts requirement.293
Thus, judicial clarification of what is necessary for courts to as-
sert personal jurisdictionto enjoin absent class members should suf-
fice. However, if, in order for federal courts to enjoin all the litiga-
tion that it is desirable for them to enjoin, it is necessary for federal
courts to be able to exercise a broader scope of personal jurisdiction
than is currently available, that lack of authority is amenable to a
291. See supra note 226.
292. Compare, with the position taken in the text, the definition of an in-
junction within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994) as an order di-
rected to a party, enforceable by contempt, and designed to afford some or all of
the substantive relief sought by a complainant. See 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 221, § 3922, at 65; see also id: § 3922.2, at 95 (stating that "[£]inal judg-
ment doctrine regularly denies appeal from orders designed to control the con-
duct of litigation as a matter of procedure"). Ironically, however, anti-suit in-
junctions are generally held to be appealable as injunctions. See id. § 3922.2, at
113; § 3923, at 123-25 (citing cases where anti-suit injunctions were appealed).
But see Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 1278-79
(3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting an appeal from an injunction against prosecution of an-
other proceeding because the order did not grant any part of the relief requested
on the merits and was better viewed as relating primarily to venue). In their
treatise, Wright, Miller & Cooper compliment the reasoning, but disapprove the
Hershey decision because of the severity of the intrusion on the court whose pro-
ceedings are enjoined, because of the particular intolerability of that intrusion
when a federal court restrains proceedings in the courts of a state, and because
this approach would require case-by-case determination of whether anti-suit
injunctions involved relief on the merits. See 17 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 221,
§ 3923, at 123-24 n.!. The first two of these factors also might influence how
stringently one determines personal jurisdiction to enjoin, but I think that the
analysis proposed in the text is sufficiently stringent.
293. For a contrasting view, see 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 9.26, at 268
(2d ed. 1985) (opining that a class action court lacks personal jurisc;iiction to en-
join class members except insofar as the court obtains personal jurisdiction over
individual class members by individual service of process). On this view, courts
lack personal jurisdiction to enjoin at least the inactive absent members of cer-
tified classes of any variety from initiating or pursuing related litigation in
other fora, absent minimum contacts between the class members and the class
action forum. Since most absent class members do not engage in litigation ac-
tivity from which general consent fairly can be inferred, the courts would be
hard pressed to find a personal jurisdictional basis to enjoin most class mem-
bers, unless they happened to have minimum contacts with the forum.
2001] LIMITED GENEROSITY CLASSES 1109
legislative cure.294 None of this is to say that the class members
need not be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the ques-
tion whether their litigation should be enjoined; they should, par-
ticularly since, on this matter, they will not be adequately repre-
sented by the class representative parties or the class attorney.
Finally, I believe that much of what was said in the preceding
two paragraphs applies equally to state courts that certify manda-
tory (limited generosity) punitive damages classes. For the same
reasons as stated above, these courts should be recognized to have
personal jurisdiction to enjoin class members from commencing or
prosecuting litigation in other states' courts when a judgment by the
class action court, on the merits of that action, will satisfy due proc-
ess and bind the members of the class, and when an anti-suit in-
junction is necessary in aid of the state court's jurisdiction. How-
ever, state legislatures cannot authorize state courts to assert
jurisdiction over persons who lack minimum contacts with the forum
state. Thus, in some cases, state courts might not be able to enjoin
all litigation that would undermine a mandatory punitive damages
class.
V. CONCLUSION
The virtues of mandatory limited generosity classes in enabling
courts to impose large but appropriate punitive damages awards
upon culpable defendants, avoid "overkill," equitably distribute the
damages among injured parties, and conserve judicial and party re-
sources seem to far outweigh the drawbacks. Whether such classes
are legally viable under rules like Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nonetheless re-
mains in doubt. Difficulties attend certification of mandatory lim-
ited generosity classes based upon state law limits on punitive dam-
ages, when choice of law principles dictate that the laws of multiple
states be applied. Even when federal due process principles avoid
multiple-law problems, issues crop up at various points along the
way in (1) determining a definitely ascertained limit which, at its
294. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994); Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (indicating that Congress may enact legislation au-
thorizing federal courts to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction). The ALI
Complex Litigation Project similarly proposed to expand the jurisdictional
power of transferee courts by authorizing them to serve persons nationwide in
order to allow those courts the authority to enjoin non-parties, if necessary,
wherever they might be located.
Insofar as a potential antisuit injunction may run against persons
who are not parties to any of the litigation in the transferee court, the
authorization for the court to issue a binding order effectively expands
the jurisdictional power of the transferee court to allow that limited
authority over nonparties wherever they may be located. Similar na-
tionwide authority is contained in the antisuit injunction statute tied
to interpleader suits.
AM. LAw INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS, Reporter's Notes to Comment b § 5.04, at 268-69 (citations omitted).
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maximum, is exceeded by aggregate liquidated punitive damages
claims, and which is (2) to be distributed equitably, and perhaps pro
rata, (3) to all those who should share in the award; and in doing all
this (4) without violating the federal Rules Enabling Act (or state
law analogues) and (5) without abrogating Seventh Amendment
guarantees, or analogous state law. I am optimistic, but far from
certain, that the issues can be resolved so as to allow such limited
generosity classes. If the current rules do not permit such classes,
there would seem to be sufficient reason to amend the rules to au-
thorize them. Such amendments would not however overcome ob-
stacles that derive from fundamental limits on the scope of proce-
dural rules or constitutional guarantees ofjury trial.
If we can get over or around those hurdles, the next question
should be the permissibility of anti-suit injunctions to prevent such
mandatory punitive damages classes from being undermined by the
prosecution of separate actions by class members who would seek to
assert punitive damages claims that are within the scope ofthe class
action. If mandatory punitive damages classes can properly be certi-
fied, the certifYing courts, whether federal or state, should have
power-so far as due process requirements for personal jurisdiction
will permit-to enjoin the prosecution of separate actions that assert
punitive damages claims within the scope of the class action. The
courts supervising such competing litigation would be wise to re-
spect those injunctions. As is the case with limited generosity class
certifications themselves, the law "isn't quite there" yet, but it is
close. If the courts do not take the necessary steps themselves, leg-
islatures can assist with authorization of injunctions, limited (espe-
cially in the case of state courts) by restrictions on exercises of per-
sonal jurisdiction to enjoin. Where action is necessary that is
beyond the powers of any state court, federal courts may be able to
do the certifYing and the enjoining. Then we may have both manda-
tory punitive damages classes and the injunctive tools to enable
those classes to serve their laudable purposes.
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(The substantive limitations on punitive damages are bolded; the
procedural prescriptions that attend the possible imposition of puni-
tive damages appear in ordinary typeface. Reasonable minds may
differ, however, as to what is substantive and what is procedural.)
CALIFORNIA
CAL. CN. CODE § 3294. Exemplary damages; when allowable; defi-
nitions provides, in part, that:
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual dam-
ages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant.
§ 3295. Protective order; prima facie case of liability prerequisite to
certain evidence; discovery limitations; evidence of profits or finan-
cial condition
(a) The court may, for good cause, grant any defendant a pro-
tective order requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of a
prima facie case of liability for damages pursuant to Section
3294, prior to the introduction of evidence of:
(1) The profits the defendant has gained by virtue of the
wrongful course of conduct of the nature and type
shown by the evidence.
(2) The financial condition of the defendant.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the .introduction of
prima facie evidence to establish a case for damages pursu-
ant to Section 3294.
(c) No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be permitted
with respect to the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1)
and (2) of subdivision (a) unless the court enters an order
permitting such discovery pursuant to this subdivision.
However, the plaintiff may subpoena documents or wit-
nesses to be available at the trial for the purpose of estab-
lishing the profits or financial condition referred to in sub-
division (a), and the defendant may be required to identify
documents in the defendant's possession which are relevant
and admissible for that purpose and the witnesses employed
by or related to the defendant who would be most competent
to testify to those facts. Upon motion by the plaintiff sup-
ported by appropriate affidavits and after a hearing, if the
court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court may at any
time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise pro-
hibited by this subdivision ifthe court finds, on the basis of
the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the
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plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probabil-
ity that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to
Section 3294. Such order shall not be considered to be a de-
termination on the merits of the claim or any defense
thereto and shall not be given in evidence or referred to at
the trial.
(d) The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude
the admission of evidence of that defendant's profits or fi-
nancial condition until after the trier of fact returns a ver-
dict for plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds that a
defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud in accor-
dance with Section 3294. Evidence of profit and financial
condition shall be admissible only as to the defendant or de-
fendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be guilty of
malice, oppression, or fraud. Evidence of profit and finan-
cial condition shall be presented to the same trier of fact
that found for the plaintiff and found one or more defen-
dants guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud.
(e) No claim for exemplary damages shall state an amount or
amounts.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3294(a), 3295(a)-(e) (Deering 1984 & Supp. 2001).
CONNECTICUT
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b)
Punitive damages may be awarded if the claimant proves that the
harm suffered was the result of the product seller's reckless disre-
gard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were
injured by the product. If the trier of fact determines that punitive
damages should be awarded, the court shall determine the
amount of such damages not to exceed an amount equal to
twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West 1991).
FLORIDA
FLA. STAT. 768.73. Punitive damages; limitation.
(1) (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c),
an award of punitive damages may not exceed the
greater of:
1. Three times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded to each claimant entitled thereto,
consistent with the remaining provisions of this
section; or
2. The sum of $ 500,000.
(b) Where the fact finder determines that the
wrongful conduct proven under this section was
motivated solely by unreasonable financial gain
and determines that the unreasonably dangerous
nature of the conduct, together with the high like-
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lihood of injury resulting from the conduct, was
actually known by the managing agent, director,
officer, or other person responsible for making pol-
icy decisions on behalf of the defendant, it may
award an amount of punitive damages not to ex-
ceed the greater of:
1. Four times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded to each claimant entitled
thereto, consistent with the remaining provi-
sions of this section; or
2. The sum of $ 2 million.
(c) Where the fact finder determines that at the
time of injury the defendant had a specific intent
to harm the claimant and determines that the
defendant's conduct did in fact harm the claimant,
there shall be no cap on punitive damages.
(d) This subsection is not intended to prohibit an appro-
priate court from exercising its jurisdiction under s.
768.74 in determining the reasonableness of an award of
punitive damages that is less than three times the
amount of compensatory damages.
(2) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), punitive
damages may not be awarded against a defendant
in a civil action if that defendant establishes, be-
fore trial, that punitive damages have previously
been awarded against that defendant in any state
or federal court in any action alleging harm from
the same act or single course of conduct for which
the claimant seeks compensatory damages. For
purposes of a civil action, the term "the same act or sin-
gle course of conduct" includes acts resulting in the same
manufacturing defects, acts resulting in the same defects
in design, or failure to warn of the same hazards, with
respect to similar units of a product.
(b) In subsequent civil actions involving the same act or
single course of conduct for which punitive damages have
already been awarded, if the court determines by clear
and convincing evidence that the amount of prior puni-
tive damages awarded was insufficient to punish that de-
fendant's behavior, the court may permit a jury to con-
sider an award of subsequent punitive damages. In
permitting a jury to consider awarding subsequent puni-
tive damages, the court shall make specific findings of
fact in the record to support its conclusion. In addition,
the court. may consider whether the defendant's act or
course of conduct has ceased. Any subsequent puni-
tive damage awards must be reduced by the
amount of any earlier punitive damage awards
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rendered in state or federal court.
(3) The claimant attorney's fees, if payable from the judgment,
are, to the extent that the fees are based on the punitive
damages, calculated based on the final judgment for puni-
tive damages. This subsection does not limit the payment of
attorney's fees based upon an award of damages other than
punitive damages.
(4) The jury may neither be instructed nor informed as to the
provisions of this section.
(5) The provisions of this section shall be applied to all causes
of action arising after the effective date of this act.
FLA. STAT. ANN. CR. 768.73 (West Supp. 2001).
GEORGIA
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1. Punitive damages (e) (1) In a tort
case in which the cause.of action arises from product liabil-
ity, there shaH be no limitation regarding the amount which
may be awarded as punitive damages. Only one award of
punitive damages may be recovered in a court in this state
from a defendant for any act or omission if the cause of ac-
tion arises from product liability, regardless of the number
of causes of action which may arise from such act or omis-
sion.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.l(e)(l) (2001). But see McBride v. General
Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding the
one-award provision set forth in the second sentence of paragraph
(e)(l) to be unconstitutional, null and void, because violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Georgia and federal
constitutions).
ILLINOIS
§ 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.05. Limitations on recovery of pu-
nitive damages in cases other than healing art or legal malpractice
cases
Sec. 2-1115.05. Limitations on recovery of punitive damages in
cases other than healing art or legal malpractice cases.
(a) In all cases on account of bodily injury, or physical damage
to property based on negligence, or product liability based
on any theory or doctrine, other than those cases described
in Section 2-1115 [735 ILCS 5/2-1115], punitive damages
may be awarded only if actual damages are awarded. The
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded for
a claim in any civil action subject to this Section shaH
not exceed 3 times the amount awarded to the claim-
ant for the economic damages on which such claim is
based.
(b) To recover punitive damages in cases described in subsec-
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tion (a), a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant's conduct was with evil motive or
with a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly un-
reasonable risk of harm and with a conscious indifference to
the rights and safety of others. "Clear and convincing evi-
dence" means that measure or degree of proof that will pro-
duce in the mind of the trier of fact a high degree of cer-
tainty as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established. This evidence requires a greater degree of per-
suasion than is necessary to meet the preponderance of the
evidence standard.
(c) In any action including a claim for punitive damages, a de-
fendant may request that the issues relating to punitive
damages be tried separately from the other issues in the ac-
tion. If such a request is made, the trier of fact shall first
hear evidence relevant to, and render a verdict upon, the de-
fendant's liability for compensatory damages and the
amount thereof. If the trier of fact makes an award of ac-
tual damages, the same trier of fact shall immediately hear
any additional evidence relevant to, and render a verdict
upon, the defendant's liability for punitive damages and the
amount thereof. If no award of actual damages is made, the
claim for punitive damages shall be dismissed. If the de-
fendant requests a separate proceeding concerning liability
for punitive damages pursuant to this Section, and the pro-
ceeding is held, evidence relevant only to the claim of puni-
tive damages shall be inadmissible in any proceeding to de-
termine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded.
(d) The limitations of subsection (a) shall not apply in a
case in which a plaintiff seeks damages against an
individual on account of death, bodily injury, or
physical damage to property based on any theory or
doctrine due to an incident or occurrence for which
the individual has been charged and convicted of a
criminal act for which a period of incarceration is or
may be a part of the sentence.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to create a right
to recover punitive damages.
(f) This amendatory Act of 1995 applies to causes of action ac-
cruing on or after its effective date.
§ 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05 (West Supp. 2001). The
Act was approved March 9, 1995 and is applicable to causes of action
as specified in each Section or part of the Act.
MINNESOTA
MINN. STAT. § 549.20. Punitive damages
Subdivision 1.
(a) Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon
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clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant
show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.
(b) A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the
rights or safety of others if the defendant has knowledge of
facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others and:
(1) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional
disregard of the high degree of probability of injury to
the rights or safety of others; or
(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others.
Subd. 2. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a mas-
ter or principal because of an act done by an agent only if:
Subd.3. Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those
factors which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, in-
cluding the seriousness of hazard to the public arising from the de-
fendant's misconduct, the profitability of the misconduct to the de-
fendant, the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it,
the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its ex-
cessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discov-
ery of the misconduct, the number and level of employees involved
in causing or concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of
the defendant, and the total effect of other punishment likely to be
imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including
compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff and other
similarly situated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty
to which the defendant may be subject.
Subd. 4. Separate proceeding. In a civil action in which punitive
damages are sought, the trier of fact shall, if requested by any of the
parties, first determine whether compensatory damages are to be
awarded. Evidence of the financial condition of the defendant and
other evidence relevant only to punitive damages is not admissible
in that proceeding. After a determination has been made, the trier
of fact shall, in a separate proceeding, determine whether and in
what amount punitive damages will be awarded.
Subd.5. Judicial review. The court shall specifically review the pu-
nitive damages award in light of the factors set forth in subdivision
3 and shall make specific findings with respect to them. The appel-
late court, if any, also shall review the award in light of the factors
set forth in that subdivision. Nothing in this section may be con-
strued to restrict either court's authority to limit punitive damages.
MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (2000).
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MISSISSIPPI
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65. Punitive damages
(1) In any action in which punitive damages are sought:
(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does
not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defen-
dant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with
actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or
committed actual fraud.
(b) In any action in which the claimant seeks an award of puni-
tive damages, the trier of fact shall first determine whether
compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what
.amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive
damages.
(c) If, but only if, an award of compensatory damages has been
made against a party, the court shall promptly commence
an evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact to de-
termine whether punitive damages may be considered.
(d) The court shall determine whether the issue of punitive
damages may be submitted to the trier offact; and, if so, the
trier of fact shall determine whether to award punitive
damages and in what amount.
(e) In all cases involving an award of punitive damages, the
fact finder, in determining the amount of punitive damages,
shall consider, to the extent relevant, the following: the de-
fendant's financial condition and net worth; the nature and
reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing, for example,
the impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff, or the
relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff; the defen-
dant's awareness of the amount of harm being caused and
the defendant's motivation in causing such harm; the dura-
tion of the defendant's misconduct and whether the defen-
dant attempted to conceal such misconduct; and any other
circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on deter-
mining a proper amount of punitive damages. The trier of
fact shall be instructed that the primary purpose of punitive
damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar mis-
conduct in the future by the defendant and others while the
purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff
whole.
(f) Before entering judgment for an award of punitive damages
the trial court shall ascertain that the award is reasonable
in its amount and rationally related to the purpose to pun-
ish what occurred giving rise to the award and to deter its
repetition by the defendant and others.
(ii) In determining whether the award is excessive, the
court shall take into consideration the following factors:
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1. Whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
punitive damage award and the harm likely to result
from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that ac-
tually occurred;
2. The degree of reprehensibility ofthe defendant's conduct,
the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness,
any concealment, and the existence and frequency of
similar past conduct;
3. The financial condition and net worth of the defendant;
and
4. In mitigation, the imposition of criminal sanctions on the
defendant for its conduct and the existence of other civil
awards against the defendant for the same conduct.
(g) The seller of a product other than the manufacturer shall
not be liable for punitive damages unless the seller exer-
cised substantial control over that aspect of the design, test-
ing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that
caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought;
the seller altered or modified the product, and the alteration
or modification was a substantial factor in causing the harm
for which recovery of damages is sought; the seller had ac-
tual knowledge of the defective condition of the product at
the time he supplied same; or the seller made an express
factual representation about the aspect of the product which
caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.
(3) The provisions of Section 11-1-65 shall not apply to:
(a) Contracts;
(b) Libel and slander; or
(c) Causes of action for persons and property arising out of
asbestos.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 2001).
MISSOURI
Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.263. Bifurcated trial may be requested by any
party if punitive damages involved, procedure-post-trial motion for
credit on punitive damages, procedure-credit not allowed, when-
doctrine of remittitur and additur applied to awards
1. All actions tried before a jury involving punitive damages
shall be conducted in a bifurcated trial before the same jury if
requested by any party.
2. In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, in which the issue of
punitive damages is submissible, the jury shall determine li-
ability for compensatory damages, the amount of compensa-
tory damages, including nominal damages, and the liability of
a defendant for punitive damages. Evidence of defendant's fi-
nancial condition shall not be admissible in the first stage of
such trial unless admissible for a proper purpose other than
the amount of punitive damages.
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3. If during the first stage of a bifurcated trial the jury deter-
mines that a defendant is liable for punitive damages, that
jury shall determine, in a second stage of trial, the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded against such defendant. Evi-
dence of such defendant's net worth shall be admissible dur-
ing the second stage of such trial.
4. Within the time for filing a motion for new trial, a defendant
may file a post-trial motion requesting the amount awarded
by the jury as punitive damages be credited by the court with
amounts previously paid by the defendant for punitive dam-
ages arising out of the same conduct on which the imposition
of punitive damages is based. At any hearing, the burden on
all issues relating to such a credit shall be on the defendant
and either party may introduce relevant evidence on such mo-
tion. Such a motion shall be determined by the trial court
within the time and according to procedures applicable to mo-
tions for new trial. If the trial court sustains such a motion
the trial court shall credit the jury award of punitive damages
by the amount found by the trial court to have been previ-
ously paid by the defendant arising out of the same conduct
and enter judgment accordingly. If the defendant fails to es-
tablish entitlement to .a credit under the provisions of this
section, or the trial court finds from the evidence that the de-
fendant's conduct out of which the prior punitive damages
award arose was not the same conduct on which the imposi-
tion of punitive damages is based in the pending action, or the
trial court finds the defendant unreasonably continued the
conduct after acquiring actual knowledge of the dangerous
nature of such conduct, the trial court shall disallow such
credit, or, if the trial court finds that the laws regarding puni-
tive damages in the state in which the prior award of punitive
damages was entered substantially and materially deviate
from the law of the state of Missouri and that the nature of
such deviation provides good cause for disallowance of the
credit based on the public policy of Missouri, then the trial
court may disallow all or any part of the credit provided by
this section.
5. The credit allowable under this section shall not apply to
causes of action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, criminal conversation, malicious prosecution or
fraud.
6. The doctrines of remittitur and additur, based on the trial
judge's assessment of the totality of the surrounding circum-
stances, shall apply to punitive damage awards.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.263 (1999).
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NEBRASKA
NEB. CONST. ART. VII, § 5. Fines, penalties, and license money; allo~
cation; use offorfeited conveyances
Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, all
fines, penalties, and license money arising under the general laws of
the state, except fines and penalties for violation of laws prohibiting
the overloading ofvehicles used upon the public roads and highways
of this state, shall belong and be paid over to the counties respec~
tively where the same may be levied or imposed, and all fines, pen~
alties, and license money arising under the rules, bylaws, or ordi-
nances of cities, villages, precincts, or other municipal subdivision
less than a county shall belong and be paid over to the same respec-
tively. All such fines, penalties, and license money shall be appro-
priated exclusively to the use and support of the common schools in
the respective subdivisions where the same may accrue, except that
all fines and penalties for violation of laws prohibiting the overload-
ing of vehicles used upon the public roads and highways shall be
placed as follows: Seventy-five per cent in a fund for state highways
and twenty-five per cent to the county general fund where the fine
or penalty is paid.
Fifty per cent of all money forfeited or seized pursuant to en-
forcement of the drug laws shall belong and be paid over to the
counties for drug enforcement purposes as the Legislature may pro-
vide.
Law enforcement agencies may use conveyances forfeited pur-
suant to enforcement of the drug laws as the Legislature may pro~
vide. Upon the sale of such conveyances, the proceeds shall be ap~
propriated exclusively to the use and support of the common schools
as provided in subsection (1) of this section.
NEB. CONST. ART. VII, § 5 (2000). According to Distinctive Printing
& Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W. 3d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989), Ne~
braska imposes a total ban on "punitive, vindictive, or exemplary
damages."
NEVADA
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005. Exemplary and punitive damages:
In general; limitations on amount of award; determination in subse-
quent proceeding
Except as otherwise provided in NRS 42.007, in an action for
the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the compensatory damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defen~
dant. Except as otherwise provided in this section or by spe-
cific statute, an award of exemplary or punitive damages
made pursuant to this section may not exceed: (a) Three
times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the
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plaintiff if the amount of compensatory damages is $100,000
or more; or (b) Three hundred thousand dollars if the
amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff is
less than $100,000.
The limitations on the amount of an award of exemplary
or punitive damages prescribed in subsection 1 do not apply
to an action brought against: (a) A manufacturer, distributor
or seller of a defective product; (b) An insurer who acts in bad
faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage; (c) A
person for violating a state or federal law prohibiting discriminatory
housing practices, if the law provides for a remedy of exemplary or
punitive damages in excess of the limitations prescribed in subsec-
tion 1; (d) A person for damages or an injury caused by the
emission, disposal or spilling of a toxic, radioactive or haz-
ardous material or waste; or (e) A person for defamation.
If punitive damages are claimed pursuant to this section, the
trier of fact shall make a finding of whether such damages will be
assessed. If such damages are to be assessed, a subsequent proceed-
ing must be conducted before the same trier of fact to determine the
amount of such damages to be assessed. The trier of fact shall make
a finding of the amount to be assessed according to the provisions of
this section. The findings required by this section, ifmade by a jury,
must be made by special verdict along with any other required find-
ings. The jury must not be instructed, or otherwise advised, of the
limitations on the amount of an award of punitive damages pre-
scribed in subsection 1.
Evidence of the financial condition of the defendant is not ad-
missible for the purpose of determining the amount of punitive
damages to be assessed until the commencement of the subsequent
proceeding to determine the amount of exemplary or punitive dam-
ages to be assessed.
5. For the purposes of an action brought against an insurer
who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance
coverage, the definitions set forth in NRS 42.001 are not applicable
and the corresponding provisions of the common law apply.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (2001)
NEW HAMPSHIRE
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16. Punitive Damages Outlawed
No punitive damages shall be awarded in any action, unless
otherwise provided by statute.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2000).
NEW JERSEY
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13. Bifurcated trial at defendant's re-
quest
a. Any actions involving punitive damages shall, if requested by
any defendant, be conducted in a bifurcated trial.
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b. In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, the trier offact shall de-
termine liability for compensatory damages and the amount
of compensatory damages or nominal damages. Evidence
relevant only to the issues of punitive damages shall not be
admissible in this stage.
c. Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory dam-
ages have been awarded in the first stage of the trial. An
award of nominal damages cannot support an award of puni-
tive damages.
d. In the second stage of a bifurcated trial, the trier of fact shall
determine if a defendant is liable for punitive damages.
e. In any action in which there are two or more defendants, an
award of punitive damages must be specific as to a defendant,
and each defendant is liable only for the amount of the award
made against that defendant.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13 (2001).
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CENT. CODE, § 32-03.2-11. When court or jury may give exem-
plary damages; multiple defendants
1. In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract, when the defendant has been guilty by clear and
convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or actual malice, the
court or jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant. Upon commencement of the action, the complaint
may not seek exemplary damages. After filing the suit, a
party may make a motion to amend the pleadings to claim ex-
emplary damages. The motion must allege an applicable legal
basis for awarding exemplary damages and must be accom-
panied by one or more affidavits or deposition testimony
showing the factual basis for the claim. The party opposing
the motion may respond with affidavit or deposition testi-
mony. If the court finds, after considering all submitted evi-
dence, that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by
the trier of fact that a preponderance of the evidence proves
oppression, fraud, or actual malice, the court shall grant the
moving party permission to amend the pleadings to claim ex-
emplary damages. For purposes of tolling the statute of limi-
tations, pleadings amended under this section relate back to
the time the action was commenced.
2. If either party so elects, the trier of fact shall first determine
whether compensatory damages are to be awarded before ad-
dressing any issues related to exemplary damages. Evidence
relevant only to the claim for exemplary damages is not ad-
missible in the proceeding on liability for compensatory dam-
ages. If an award of compensatory damages has been made,
the trier of fact shall determine whether exemplary damages
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are to be awarded.
3. Evidence of a defendant's financial condition or net worth is
not admissible in the proceeding on exemplary damages.
4. If the trier of fact determines that exemplary damages
are to be awarded, the amount of exemplary damages
may not exceed two times the amount of compensatory
damages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars, which-
ever is greater; provided, however, that no award of exem-
plary damages may be made if the claimant is not entitled to
compensatory damages. In a jury trial, the jury may not be in-
formed of the limit on damages contained in this subsection.
Any jury award in excess of this limit must be reduced by the
court.
5. In order for a party to recover exemplary damages, the finder
of fact shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the
amount of exemplary damages awarded is consistent with the
following principles and factors:
a. Whether· there is a reasonable relationship between the
exemplary damage award claimed and the harm likely to
result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm
that actually has occurred;
b. The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct
and the duration of that conduct; and
c. Any of the following factors as to which evidence is pre-
sented:
(1) The defendant's awareness of and any concealment of
the conduct;
(2) The profitability to the defendant of the wrongful
conduct and the desirability of removing that profit
and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; and
(3) Criminal sanctions imposed on the defendant for the
same conduct that is the basis for the exemplary
damage claim, these to be taken into account if of-
fered in mitigation of the exemplary damage award.
6. Exemplary damages may not be awarded against a manufac-
turer or seller if the product's manufacture, design, formula-
tion, inspection, testing, packaging, labeling, and warning
complied with:
a. Federal statutes existing at the time the product was
produced;
b. Administrative regulations existing at the time the prod-
uct was produced that were adopted by an agency of the
federal government which had responsibility to regulate
the safety of the product or to establish safety standards
for the product pursuant to a federal statute; or
c. Premarket approval or certification by an agency of the
federal government.
7. The defense in subsection 6 does not apply if the plaintiff
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proves by clear and convincing evidence that the product
manufacturer or product seller:
a. Knowingly and in violation of applicable agency regula-
tions withheld or misrepresented information required to
be submitted to the agency, which information was mate-
rial and relevant to the harm in question; or
b. Made an illegal payment to an official of the federal
agency for the purpose of securing approval of the prod-
uct.
8. Exemplary damages may be awarded against a principal be-
cause of an act by an agent only if at least one of the following
is proved by clear and convincing evidence to be true:
a. The principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing
and manner of the act;
b. The agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial
agent was reckless in employing or retaining the agent;
c. The agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment; or
d. The principal or managerial agent ratified or approved
the doing and manner of the act.
9. In a civil action involving a motor vehicle accident resulting in
bodily injury, it is sufficient for the trier of fact to consider an
award of exempla.ry damages against the driver under the
motion procedures provided in subsection 1 if clear and con-
vincing evidence indicates that the accident was caused by a
driver who, within the five years immediately preceding the
accident has been convicted for violation of section 39-08-01
and who was operating or in physical control of a motor vehi-
cle:
a. With an alcohol concentration of at least ten one-
hundredths of one percent by weight;
b. Under the influence of a controlled substance unless a
drug that predominantly caused impairment was used
only as directed or cautioned by a practitioner who le-
gally prescribed or dispensed the drug to the driver;
c. Under the influence of alcohol and refused to take a test
required under chapter 39-20; or
d. Under the influence of a volatile chemical as listed in sec-
tion 12.1-31-06. At the trial in an action in which the
trier of fact will consider an award of exemplary dam-
ages, evidence that the driver has been convicted of vio-
lating section 39-08-01 or an equivalent statute or ordi-
nance is admissible into evidence.
N.D. CENT. CODE, § 32-03.2-11 (2000).
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TEX. CN. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§41.001-41.004, 41.007
§ 41.001. Definitions
In this chapter:
(1) "Claimant" means a party, including a plaintiff, counter-
claimant, cross- claimant, or third-party plaintiff, seeking
recovery of exemplary damages. In a cause of action in
which a party seeks recovery of exemplary damages related
to injury to another person, damage to the property of an-
other person, death of another person, or other harm to an-
other person, "claimant" includes both that other person
and the party seeking recovery of exemplary damages.
(2) "Clear and convincing" means the measure or degree of proof
that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm be-
lief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to
be established.
(3) "Defendant" means a party, including a counterdefendant,
cross-defendant, or third-party defendant, from whom a
claimant seeks reliefwith respect to exemplary damages.
(4) "Economic damages" means compensatory damages for pe-
cuniary loss; the term does not include exemplary damages
or damages for physical pain and mental anguish, loss of
consortium, disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of
companionship and society.
(5) "Exemplary damages" means any damages awarded as a
penalty or by way of punishment. "Exemplary damages" in-
cludes punitive damages.
(6) "Fraud" means fraud other than constructive fraud.
(7) "Malice" means:
(A) a specific intent by the defendant to cause substantial
injury to the claimant; or
(B) an act or omission:
(i) which when viewed objectively from the standpoint
of the actor at the time of its occurrence involves an
extreme degree of risk, considering the probability
and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and
(ii) of which the actor has actual, subjective awareness
of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with
conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or wel-
fare of others.
§ 41.002. Applicability
(a) This chapter applies to any action in which a claimant seeks
exemplary damages relating to a cause of action.
(b) This chapter establishes the maximum exemplary damages
that may be awarded in an action subject to this chapter,
including an action for which exemplary damages are
awarded under another law of this state. This chapter does
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not apply to the extent another law establishes a lower
maximum amount of exemplary damages for a particular
claim.
(c) Except as provided by Subsections (b) and (d), in an action
to which this chapter applies, the provisions of this chapter
prevail over all other law to the extent of any conflict.
(d) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, this chapter
does not apply to Section 15.21, Business & Commerce Code
(Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983), an action
brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices- Consumer
Protection Act (Subchapter E, Chapter 17, Business &
Commerce Code) except as specifically provided in Section
17.50 of that Act, or an action brought under Chapter 21,
Insurance Code.
§ 41.003. Standards for Recovery of Exemplary Damages
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (c), exemplary damages
may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the harm with respect to which the
claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages results from:
(1) fraud;
(2) malice; or
(3) willful act or omission or gross neglect in wrongful death
actions brought by or on behalf of a surviving spouse or
heirs of the decedent's body, under a statute enacted
pursuant to Section 26, Article XVI, Texas Constitution.
In such cases, the definition of "gross neglect" in the in-
struction submitted to the jury shall be the definition
stated in Section 41.001(7)(B).
(b) The claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence
the elements of exemplary damages as provided by this sec-
tion. This burden of proof may not be shifted to the defen-
dant or satisfied by evidence of ordinary negligence, bad
faith, or a deceptive trade practice.
(c) If the claimant relies on a statute establishing a cause of ac-
tion and authorizing exemplary damages in specified cir-
cumstances or in conjunction with a specified culpable men-
tal state, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
damages result from the specified circumstances or culpable
mental state.
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by clear and convincing evidence that the harm with respect
to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages
results from malice as defined in Section 41.00l(7)(A). Ex-
emplary damages may not be awarded to a claimant
who elects to have his recovery multiplied under an-
other statute.
§ 41.007. Prejudgment Interest Prejudgment interest may not be
assessed or recovered on an award of exemplary damages.
TEX. CIY. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§41.001-41.004, 41.007 (West,
2001).
